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Chasing Bits across Borders
Patricia L. Belliat
In February of 2000, the websites of at least eight major
U.S.-based internet companies were crippled after a hacker pro-
grammed dozens of computers to make thousands of simultane-
ous requests to connect to the target systems each minute.1 One
market research firm estimated that these distributed "denial of
service" attacks-so named because the crippled system is unable
to serve its legitimate users2_-could cause $1.2 billion in dam-
t Assistant Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. A.J. Bellia, Paul Berman, Bob
Blakey, Paolo Carozza, Erika Dreifus, Jimmy Gurul6, Orin Kerr, John F. Murphy, John
Nagle, Todd Peterson, Betty-Ellen Shave, Dinah Shelton, Jeff Singdahlsen, Kevin Smith,
Allan Stein, Bill Treanor, and Jay Wexler provided helpful comments on an earlier draft of
this Article. I am grateful for the assistance of research librarians Dwight King, Hector
Escobar, Patti Ogden, and Warren Rees. Jennifer Camden and Jason Flaherty provided
excellent research assistance.
I See Charles Cooper, New Cybersport: Taking out Web Sites?, ZDNet News (Feb 10,
2000), available online at <http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2435899,00.
html> (visited Aug 12, 2000) [on file with U Chi Legal F] (listing the targeted sites). For a
description of the incidents, see Internet Denial of Service Attacks and the Federal Re-
sponse, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Crime of the House Committee on the Judi-
ciary and the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 106th Cong, 2d Sess 35-37 (2000) (statement of Michael A. Vatis, Director,
National Infrastructure Protection Center, Federal Bureau of Investigation) (detailing
how the hacker's cyber attack functioned, listing how the FBI and security firms warned
the public, and describing the series of attacks); Cybercrime, Hearing before the Subcom-
mittee on Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies of the Senate
Committee on Appropriations, 106th Cong, 2d Sess 25-26 (2000) (statement of Louis J.
Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation) (detailing how the hacker's cyber attack
functioned, listing how the FBI and security firms warned the public, and describing the
series of attacks). The target systems included Yahoo!, eBay, Buy.com, Amazon.com,
E*Trade, MSN.com, CNN.com, and ZDNet.
2 A simple denial of service ("DoS") attack typically involves a single computer mak-
ing repeated connection requests in an attempt to overpower the target system. In a "dis-
tributed" denial of service ("DDoS") attack, the connection requests originate from a large
number of computers, making it difficult to distinguish attacking traffic from legitimate
traffic. See Eric J. Bowden, Of Zombies and Script Kiddies: Distributed Denial of Service
Attacks-DoS v. DDoS Attacks, ZDNet Help & How-To (Oct 26, 2000), available online at
<http://www.zdnet.com/zdhelp/stories/main/0,5594,2645417-2,00.html> (visited Oct 27,
2000) [on file with U Chi Legal F] (explaining the different tactics used in DoS and DDoS
attacks). To launch a DDoS attack, a hacker accesses a computer system without authori-
zation and places on the system a program that renders the system a "master," capable of
controlling other computer systems. The hacker also places code on the other computer
systems, causing them to operate as "agents" of the master system. The master system
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ages.3 A few months later, the "I Love You" virus infected forty-
five million computers around the world.4 The virus spread rap-
idly by installing itself in a computer's system files and causing
the computer to forward an infected electronic mail attachment to
all addressees in the user's e-mail address book.' Along with some
thirty copycat variants that surfaced in the succeeding weeks, the
"I Love You" virus cost between $6.7 billion and $10 billion in lost
productivity.
6
These two widely publicized incidents brought greater public
attention to the problem of computer crime. The FBI, computer
security sites, and technology sites offered tools and technical
advice to help prevent denial of service attacks and ward off vi-
ruses.7 Congress promptly held hearings to consider whether fed-
instructs the agents to produce a flood of simultaneous requests to connect to the target
system. See Internet Denial of Service Attacks Subcommittee Hearing at 36 (cited in note
1) (statement of Michael A. Vatis) (listing the tools hackers use to turn systems into "mas-
ters" and "agents" and explaining how they work); Cybercrime Subcommittee Hearing at
25 (cited in note 1) (statement of Louis J. Freeh) (listing the tools hackers use in DoS and
DDoS attacks).
3 See David Akin, Officials Concede Arrest in Hacker Case Could be Weeks Away,
Natl Post C6 (Feb 24, 2000); Russ Banham, Hacking It, CFO Magazine 115 (Aug 1, 2000).
4 See Paul Festa and Joe Wilcox, Experts Estimate Damages in the Billions for Bug,
CNET News.com (May 5, 2000), available online at <http://news.cnet.comnews/0-1003-
200-1814907.html> (visited Sept 14, 2000) [on file with U Chi Legal F]; Electronic Com-
munications Privacy Act of 2000, Digital Privacy Act of 2000 and Notice of Electronic
Monitoring Act, Hearings on HR 5018, HR 4987, and HR 4908 before the Subcommittee
on the Constitution of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Cong, 2d Sess (2000)
(statement of Kevin DiGregory, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division,
Department of Justice).
5 See Festa and Wilcox, Experts Estimate Damages in the Billions for Bug, CNET
News.com (cited in note 4) (explaining how the "I Love You" virus installs and forwards
itself).
6 Love Bug Damage Costs Rise to $6.7 Billion, Computer Economics eFlash (May 9,
2000), available online at <http://www.computereconomics.com/cei/press/2000/pr00509.
html> (visited Sept 12, 2000) [on file with U Chi Legal F] (noting damages of $6.7 billion
five days after virus released); Rob Kaiser, 'Love Bug' Has Cousins; They Bite Too: Cyber-
attack Considered Most Disruptive Ever, Chi Trib 1 (May 6, 2000) (projecting costs of $10
billion).
7 See, for example, Cybercrime Subcommittee Hearing at 26 (cited in note 1) (state-
ment of Louis J. Freeh) (FBI released to the public a software tool for detecting installed
DDoS software); CERT ® Advisory CA-1999-17: Denial-of-Service Tools, CERT Coordina-
tion Center Alerts (updated Mar 3, 2000), available online at <http://www.cert.org/
advisories/CA-1999-17.html> (visited Oct 27, 2000) (suggesting that sites implement in-
gress filtering); Bradley F. Shimmin, Deconstructing Denial of Service Attacks-What Can
Be Done, ZDNet Help & How-To (Feb 8, 2000), available online at <http://www.zdnet.com/
zdhelp/stories/main0,5594,2434548-3,00.html> (visited Oct 27, 2000) (noting the existence
of tools to help internet service providers detect attacks and software used in such at-
tacks); Results of the Distributed-Systems Intruder Tools Workshop, CERT Coordination
Center Reports (Dec 7, 1999), available online at <http://www.cert.org/reports/
dsit-workshop-final.html> (visited Oct 27, 2000) (providing suggestions for immediate
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eral laws and resources designed to combat attacks on computer
systems were adequate to the task.
Despite this focus on the adequacy of American laws and
American enforcement efforts, the denial of service attacks and
the "I Love You" virus each provide a dramatic illustration of the
fact that national borders are largely irrelevant when it comes to
committing computer crime. The denial of service attacks tar-
geted servers physically located in the United States, but a teen-
ager in Canada staged the attacks.' The "I Love You" virus origi-
nated in the Philippines and spread rapidly through government
and corporate systems in more than 20 countries.10 An interna-
tional element is often present, not only when a computer system
is the target of a crime, but also when a system merely facilitates
online forms of traditional crimes or serves as a repository for
evidence of a crime." Computer networks are used to offer online
short-term and long-term protection of internet service providers); [all internet materials
cited in this note on file with U Chi Legal F].
8 See Internet Denial of Service Attacks Subcommittee Hearing (cited in note 1)
(discussing DDoS attacks and federal efforts to prevent and prosecute such crimes); Cy-
bercrime Subcommittee Hearing (cited in note 1) (discussing the nature of cybercrime and
the role of the government in promoting security on the internet); Internet Security and
Privacy, Hearing before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Cong, 2d Sess (May
25, 2000), available online at <http://www.senate.gov/-judiciary/w1525200.htm> (visited
Apr 5, 2001) [on file with U Chi Legal F] (the transcript of this hearing has not yet been
published; a list of witnesses and their respective submitted testimony is available at this
web site); The Love Bug Computer Virus: Protecting Love Sick Computers from Malicious
Attacks, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Technology of the House Committee on
Science, 106th Cong, 2d Sess (May 10, 2000), available online at <http://www.house.gov/
science/hearing-106.htm> (visited Apr 16, 2001) [on file with U Chi Legal F] (the tran-
script of this hearing has not yet been published; a list of witnesses and their respective
submitted testimony is available at this web site).
9 See Canada Broadens Its Case Against Suspected Hacker, NY Times C5 (Aug 4,
2000). The Canadian youth allegedly manipulated at least 54 computer systems to stage
the February 2000 attacks, including systems at the University of California at Santa
Barbara, Harvard, and Duke. Id; Lenny Savino, MafiaBoy May Face Harsher U.S. Justice,
Natl Post A6 (Aug 5, 2000) (noting use of Harvard and Duke computers). The youth
pleaded guilty to Canadian charges in January 2001. Graeme Hamilton, Mafiaboy Pleads
Guilty to Online Attacks, Natl Post A6 (Jan 19, 2001).
10 See ISP Tracks "Love" Bug Through Caller ID, CNET News.com (May 15, 2000),
available online at <http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1003-200-1877238.html> (visited Sept
14, 2000) [on file with U Chi Legal F] (stating that the virus apparently originated in
Manila); "Love" Bug Release May Have Been Accidental, CNET News.com (May 11, 2000),
available online at <http:I/news.cnet.com/news/0-1003-200-1855997.html> (visited Sept
14, 2000) [on file with U Chi Legal F] (noting the virus' effect on government and corpo-
rate systems in more than twenty countries). Because the Philippines lacked any com-
puter crime statute at the time of the attack, the main suspect was never prosecuted. See
William Glanz, "Love Bug" Creator Could Go Scot-Free, Wash Times B10 (May 18, 2000).
11 Commentators often distinguish between three different types of criminal conduct
involving computers. First, the computer may be the target of the crime, as in the case of
the denial of service attacks or the "I Love You" virus. Second, the computer may serve as
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gambling," convey threats, 3 transmit child pornography and lure
children into sexual conduct, 4 commit fraud,15 and evade protec-
tions on intellectual property.16 Recent enforcement efforts illus-
trate that these offenses are often international in scope. New
York and federal officials successfully targeted gaming operations
based in Antigua that offered online gambling services to New
York citizens.17 In September of 1998, officials in twelve countries
a tool for communication, facilitating crimes that take place in the brick-and-mortar
world. Third, the computer may be incidental to the crime; for example, it may hold evi-
dence of the crime. See generally Michael A. Sussmann, The Critical Challenges from
International High-Tech and Computer-Related Crime at the Millennium, 9 Duke J Comp
& Intl L 451, 455 (1999) (distinguishing the three ways criminals use computers); Marc D.
Goodman, Why the Police Don't Care About Computer Crime, 10 Harv J L & Tech 465,
468-69 (1997) (same); Scott Charney and Kent Alexander, Computer Crime, 45 Emory L J
931, 934 (1996) (same); Report of the President's Working Group on Unlawful Conduct on
the Internet, The Electronic Frontier: The Challenge of Unlawful Conduct Involving the
Use of the Internet 7-11 (Mar 2000), available online at <http://www.cybercrime.gov
unlawful.pdf> (visited Sept 14, 2000) [on file with U Chi Legal F] (same).
12 See generally National Gambling Impact Study Commission, Final Report, ch 5
(June 1999), available online at <http://www.ngisc.gov/reports/fullrpt.html> (visited Jan
29, 2001) [on file with U Chi Legal F] (describing the emergence, rapid growth, and vari-
ous forms of internet gambling and recommending methods of federal regulation).
13 See generally Report from the Attorney General to the Vice President, Cyberstalk-
ing: A New Challenge for Law Enforcement and Industry (Aug 1999), available online at
<http://www.cybercrime.gov/cyberstalking.htm> (visited Sept 14, 2000) [on file with U Chi
Legal F] (discussing the growth of cyberstalking and the use of the internet to harass and
threaten others).
14 See Report of the President's Working Group on Unlawful Conduct on the Internet,
The Electronic Frontier: The Challenge of Unlawful Conduct Involving the Use of the
Internet, appendix C (Mar 2000), available online at <http:/www.cybercrime.gov/unlawful.
pdf> (visited Sept 14, 2000) [on file with U Chi Legal F] (cited in note 11) (addressing
online child pornography, child luring, and related offenses and discussing federal laws
and initiatives to protect children).
15 In two widely reported stock manipulation cases, for example, individuals distrib-
uted false reports relating to the companies PairGain Technologies and Emulex. The re-
leases were accessed widely on the internet and dramatically affected stock prices, allow-
ing each individual to conduct trades at a significant profit. See Robin Fields, Emulex
Stock Hoax Was Triggered by E-Mail Release, LA Times C1 (Aug 31, 2000) (describing how
e-mail and the internet were used to distribute a false press release); John F.X. Peloso and
Ben A. Indek, Overview of SEC's Response to the Internet in Securities Markets, NY L J 3
(Oct 19, 2000) (explaining various SEC actions taken in response to the rise in cases of
internet securities fraud).
16 Report of the President's Working Group on Unlawful Conduct on the Internet, The
Electronic Frontier: The Challenge of Unlawful Conduct Involving the Use of the Internet
*appendix I (Mar 2000), available online at <www.cybercrime.gov/unlawful.pdf> (visited
Sept 14, 2000) [on file with U Chi Legal F] (cited in note 11) (discussing software piracy
and intellectual property theft and describing federal laws and initiatives to prevent such
crimes).
17 See People v World Interactive Gaming Corp, 714 NYS2d 844, 851-53 (NY Sup Ct
1999) (holding that Antigua-based corporation violated New York and federal gambling
laws by offering gambling to internet users in the United States); World Sports Official Is
Found Guilty in Case of Internet Wagering, Wall St J 20XX WL-WSJ 2004876 (Feb 29,
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cracked down on an internet-based child pornography ring, seiz-
ing some one hundred thousand images.18
This Article examines the challenges that computer crimes
cutting across international borders present for law enforcement
officials. As unlawful conduct involving computer systems be-
comes more widespread, evidence of that conduct will increas-
ingly take an electronic form and be stored beyond the reach of
the investigating jurisdiction. 9 And traditional mechanisms
through which countries ordinarily obtain evidence abroad are
unlikely to prove satisfactory in such investigations.' ° The inves-
tigative difficulties computer crimes pose have prompted two re-
lated state responses. Some states have asserted that they pos-
sess a broad power to conduct "remote cross-border searches" 2'
that is, to use computers within their territory to access and ex-
amine data physically stored outside of their territory-so long as
the data is relevant to an investigation of conduct over which
they have jurisdiction and their own law authorizes the search.22
In November 2000, for example, during an investigation of a Rus-
sian hacking ring that had targeted several U.S. companies, FBI
agents downloaded extensive data from Russian computers.23
2000) (reporting the successful prosecution of the president of Antigua-based World Sports
Exchange Ltd for accepting bets from Americans over the internet).
18 See Crackdown on Net Child Porn, CNET News.com (Sept 2, 1998), available online
at <http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-332841.html> (visited Sept 14, 2000) [on file
with U Chi Legal F].
19 See text accompanying notes 68-72.
20 See id.
21 1 use the term "remote cross-border searches" to encompass not only circumstances
in which officials examine data residing on a foreign computer, but also circumstances in
which officials download the data to local computers for later viewing.
22 For example, some states claim a power to conduct remote cross-border searches of
data lawfully accessible to persons within their borders, on the theory that such data is
"virtually present" there for law enforcement purposes. The simplest case is that of a
corporation that structures its network so that subsidiaries in other countries can access
centrally stored data. An early statement of a British official reflects this view. See Suss-
mann, 9 Duke J Comp & Intl L at 472 (cited in note 11), quoting Paul Boateng, Minister of
State for the Home Office (UK), Tomorrow's Challenges for Law Enforcement, Keynote
Address to the Second International Conference for Criminal Intelligence Analysts (Mar 1,
1999), ("Jurisdiction over a database should not now depend only on where it happens to
be physically stored. Where the owners of the system have set it up to be accessible from
another jurisdiction, it should be regarded as present in that jurisdiction for law enforce-
ment purposes."). As the Russian case described in the text illustrates, however, states
may claim a cross-border search power even when a network is simply connected to the
internet, without the intention of providing access to specific persons in specific countries.
23 See Application and Affidavit for Search Warrant at 11-15, 19-20, 22-29 (W D
Wash filed Dec 1, 2000) (No 00-587M) [on file with U Chi Legal F]. Public accounts of the
case suggest that the FBI lured two Russian suspects to the United States by inviting
them to apply for positions with a bogus internet security firm. Once the suspects were in
the United States, agents captured the passwords they used to connect to a Russian net-
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Other states have merely pressed for recognition of a remote
cross-border search power in international fora, arguing that
such a power is an essential weapon in efforts to combat com-
puter crime.24
This Article explores these state responses with two objec-
tives in mind. The first is to develop an appropriate framework
for evaluating the legality of cross-border searches, both as a
matter of international law and as a matter of U.S. law. This task
is growing increasingly pressing. The Russian hacking investiga-
tion represents the first case in which a government has publicly
acknowledged engaging in a remote cross-border search without
the target state's permission, but other states may quickly follow
suit. In addition, one multilateral organization recently finalized
a treaty on cybercrime containing extensive procedural provisions
concerning states' cooperation in exchanging data physically lo-
cated within their respective borders.2 Although the treaty pri-
marily envisions that a state will gather evidence from within its
borders and will then pass the evidence on to the requesting
state, it nevertheless recognizes limited but important powers to
conduct remote cross-border searches.26 Issues relating to cross-
border searches are likely to take on increasing importance in the
immediate future.
My second objective is to tie this analysis of the legality of
cross-border searches to an important scholarly debate about how
the law should adapt to the increasingly widespread use of com-
work. The agents then used the passwords to access and download data from the Russian
servers.. Once the agents seized the data, they sought a search warrant to view it. See
Mike Carter, E-sting Nets 2 Russian Hackers; FBI Alleges Pair Stole Credit Info, Seattle
Times Al (Apr 23, 2001); Robert Lemos, FBI Nabs Russian Hackers, ZDNet News (Apr 23,
2001), available online at <http://www.zdnet.com/zdnnn/stories/news/0,4586,508199,
00.html> (visited May 4, 2001) [on file with U Chi Legal F]; Robert Lemos, FBI "Hack"
Raises Global Security Concerns, CNET News.com (May 1, 2001), available online at
<http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1003-202-5785729.html> (visited May 12, 2001) [on file with
U Chi Legal F]. In May 2001, a district court denied a motion to suppress the evidence
downloaded from the Russian servers. See United States v Gorshkov, No CRO0-500C (W D
Wash May 23, 2001) [on file with U Chi Legal F]. One of the suspects was convicted of
various computer crime charges in October 2001. See Michelle Delio, 'Stung' Russian
Hacker Guilty, Wired News (Oct 17, 2001) available online at <http://www.wired.coml
news/print/0,1294,47650,00.html> (visited Oct 20, 2001) [on file with U Chi Legal F].
24 See notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
25 See notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
26 See Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, 109th Sess, Convention on Cyber-
Crime Art 32 (adopted Nov 8, 2001), available online at <http://conventions.coe.intl
Treaty/EN/projets/FinalCybercrime.htm> (visited Nov 14, 2001) [on file with U Chi Legal
F] (establishing when parties may access computer data located within another party's
borders without that party's authorization). The treaty will enter into force when five
states, including at least three members of the Council of Europe, ratify it.
[2001:
CHASING BITS ACROSS BORDERS
puter systems. The fact that online activities so often cut across
international borders raises the question whether states can and
should prescribe laws governing those activities. Underlying the
debate over state regulation of internet activities are different
conceptions of how the rise of online activities affects territorial
sovereignty-that is, a state's power to exercise control over all
persons and things within its territory.27 At one end of the debate,
commentators such as David Johnson and David Post have taken
the position that states cannot and should not regulate online
activities in the same way that they regulate other activities.2"
Because a state can only enforce its laws against persons and
property located within its borders, they argue, rules designed to
govern online activities cutting across borders will be unenforce-
able and illegitimate.29 This view at least implicitly suggests that
the appropriate conception of territorial sovereignty in the inter-
net context is a narrow one, under which states lack the power to
base regulations on harmful effects within the state's territory. At
the other end of the debate, Jack Goldsmith has argued that
regulation of transnational transactions involving the internet is
no less feasible or legitimate than regulation of other transna-
27 See Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts, eds, I Oppenheim's International Law 382
(Longmans 9th ed 1992) (discussing components of sovereignty, including "the power of a
state to exercise supreme authority over all persons and things within its territory").
28 See David R. Johnson and David G. Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 Stan L Rev 1367 (1996) (arguing that cyberspace is unique and cannot be
governed by laws that rely on traditional territorial borders, instead requiring creation of
distinct and separate doctrine to be applied to cyberspace). See also David G. Post and
David R. Johnson, "Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent". Towards A New Theory of De-
centralized Decision-Making in Complex Systems, 73 Chi Kent L Rev 1055 (1998) (using a
problem-solving dilemma to support of decentralized decision-making over the internet);
David G. Post, Governing Cyberspace, 43 Wayne L Rev 155 (1996) (arguing that the na-
ture of the internet destroys the significance of physical location, eliminating the possibil-
ity of a single, uniform legal standard); David G. Post, Anarchy, State, and the Internet: An
Essay on Law-Making in Cyberspace, 1995 J Online L Art 3 (examining the various groups
and organizations that can impose substantive rules on the internet and arguing that the
lack of physical borders in cyberspace prevents effective rule-making by centralized gov-
ernments). Others have expressed similar skepticism. See James Boyle, Foucault in Cy-
berspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hardwired Censors, 66 U Cin L Rev 177 (1997)
(recognizing the difficulties states have encountered in attempting to regulate the global
network, but arguing that certain private filtering and control mechanisms will facilitate
greater state regulation); Joel R. Reidenberg, Governing Networks and Rule-Making in
Cyberspace, 45 Emory L J 911 (1996) (arguing that the transnational nature of the inter-
net requires governance by a collection of state, business, technical, and citizen forces);
John T. Delacourt, Note, The International Impact of Internet Regulation, 38 Harv Intl L J
207 (1997) (contending that national regulation of the internet is inappropriate and that a
consensual regime of user self-regulation should be adopted).
29 See Johnson and Post, 48 Stan L Rev at 1368-78 (cited in note 28).
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tional transactions." In support of this view, Goldsmith draws
upon a broader conception of territorial sovereignty, under which
a state can prescribe rules governing conduct that has harmful
effects within its borders, even if the conduct takes place outside
of its borders. 1
Analyzing state claims to conduct cross-border searches re-
veals that the underlying debate over territorial sovereignty in
the internet context is even more complex and more important
than commentators acknowledge. As I will argue, among the cru-
cial tasks in evaluating the legality of cross-border searches is to
explore how principles of territorial sovereignty apply when a
state seeks not only to regulate extraterritorial conduct having an
effect within its borders, but also to investigate that conduct by
taking steps within its own borders that affect persons or prop-
erty in another state. A state conducting a cross-border search
and the target state are likely to have different perspectives on
the issue. The searching state may view its actions as merely ad-
vancing a claimed power to regulate extraterritorial conduct
causing harmful effects within its own borders. The target state,
however, may view a remote cross-border search itself as extra-
territorial, conduct with harmful local effects. The target state
may believe that principles of territorial sovereignty likewise
permit it to "regulate" this harmful extraterritorial conduct-for
example, by invoking certain privacy or property protections that
30 See Jack Goldsmith, Unilateral Regulation of the Internet: A Modest Defence, 11
Eur J Intl L 135 (2000) (arguing that unilateral regulation of the internet is legitimate,
that the dangers of multinational regulation are exaggerated, and that the spillover ef-
fects do not delegitimize unilateral regulation); Jack Goldsmith, Regulation of the Internet:
Three Persistent Fallacies, 73 Chi Kent L Rev 1119 (1998) (examining fallacies in the
arguments against government regulation of the internet); Jack L. Goldsmith, The Inter-
net and the Abiding Significance of Territorial Sovereignty, 5 Ind J Global Legal Stud 475
(1998) (maintaining that territorial regulation of the internet is no less feasible or legiti-
mate than territorial regulation of non-internet transactions); Jack L. Goldsmith, Against
Cyberanarchy, 65 U Chi L Rev 1199 (1998) (proposing that internet transactions be regu-
lated the same as real-space transactions); Jack Goldsmith, What Internet Gambling Leg-
islation Teaches About Internet Regulation, 32 Intl Law 1115 (1998) (explaining various
regulatory tools governments can use to regulate the internet). See also Neil Weinsteck
Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from Liberal Democratic Theory,
88 Cal L Rev 395 (2000) (concluding that selective government regulation of the internet
is a better means to protect liberal democratic ideals than self-regulation); Allan R. Stein,
The Unexceptional Problem of Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 32 Intl Law 1167 (1998) (argu-
ing that internet transactions can be understood and resolved under traditional principles
of territorial jurisdiction).
31 Goldsmith, 65 U Chi L Rev at 1208 (cited in note 30) (noting that customary inter-
national law permits a state "to apply its law to extraterritorial behavior with substantial
local effects").
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prohibit the searching officials' conduct or by objecting to such
conduct through diplomatic channels.
Which perspective should prevail? Exploring the competing
views of territorial sovereignty underlying the poles of the regula-
tion debate provides a useful starting point for this question;
evaluating cross-border search claims, in turn, highlights certain
normative bases for refining our understanding of how principles
of territorial sovereignty apply in the internet context.
I begin in Part I by outlining certain background principles of
international law relevant to a discussion of cross-border
searches. First, I explore the principle of territorial sovereignty
that, at least outside of the internet context, is thought to permit
a state to prescribe laws governing extraterritorial conduct hav-
ing harmful effects within its borders. I then contrast this princi-
ple with the customary international law prohibition on states
investigating such conduct in the territory of another sovereign.
States typically cope with this gap between their power to regu-
late conduct and their power to investigate that conduct by rely-
ing on legal assistance mechanisms. After examining these
mechanisms, I argue that they are unlikely to prove effective in a
substantial portion of computer crime cases. Indeed, as I discuss
in Part II, the limitations of traditional legal assistance mecha-
nisms have already prompted some states to assert that they pos-
sess a power to remotely acquire data accessible to persons
within their territory and others to seek recognition of such a
power in international instruments.
I explore the legality of these state responses under interna-
tional law and U.S. constitutional law in Parts III and IV respec-
tively. In Part III, I argue that how we evaluate the responses
turns in part on whether the rise of online activities cutting
across borders alters the international law principles introduced
in Part I. The principle that states have power to regulate extra-
territorial conduct with harmful local effects underlies the debate
over whether states can and should regulate the internet. Draw-
ing upon the competing views of territorial sovereignty repre-
sented in this debate, I examine whether the second principle-
that states cannot conduct investigations in the territory of other
states-applies to remote cross-border searches. I conclude that
the line that allows a state to apply its law to extraterritorial ac-
tivities but limits a state from investigating violations of those
laws in the territory of another sovereign continues to have force,
notwithstanding the widespread use of computer systems cutting
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across international borders. The customary international law
prohibition on conducting investigations in the territory of an-
other sovereign should apply even when a state conducts cross-
border searches remotely. This analysis, I argue, helps to refine
our understanding of how concepts of territorial sovereignty ap-
ply in the internet context.
Having argued that customary international law generally
prohibits unilateral cross-border searches, I turn in Part IV to an
equally difficult question of U.S. law: whether, to eliminate any
customary international law difficulties with cross-border
searches, the United States could enter into bilateral or interna-
tional agreements permitting countries to conduct cross-border
searches under their own domestic law standards-standards
potentially inconsistent with Fourth Amendment requirements. I
argue that an arrangement permitting cross-border searches of
data stored within the United States must track Fourth Amend-
ment requirements. In Part V, I note some limitations on and
implications of these conclusions.
I. JURISDICTION TO ENFORCE AND THE LIMITATIONS OF
TRADITIONAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE MECHANISMS
Before analyzing the legal issues surrounding state claims
regarding cross-border searches, it is important to establish cer-
tain background principles of international law that illustrate
why computer crime investigations present difficulties for law
enforcement officials, and that provide a starting point for our
evaluation of cross-border search claims. First, at least outside of
the internet context, states are not limited to regulating conduct
that occurs within their borders.2 Rather, international law per-
mits states to prescribe laws governing extraterritorial conduct in
certain circumstances, including when that conduct has harmful
effects within its borders. Second, customary international law
generally prohibits states from conducting investigations in an-
other state's territory without that state's consent. Countries or-
dinarily cope with the gap between their power to prescribe laws
and their power to enforce such laws by relying upon a range of
legal assistance mechanisms. I argue that such mechanisms are
unlikely to be adequate in a significant number of computer
crime cases.
32 I discuss the competing theories about whether this principle extends to the inter-
net context in Part III B. See notes 98-124 and accompanying text.
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A. Jurisdiction to Regulate and Jurisdiction to Enforce under
International Law
International law permits in some circumstances, and most
states have provided for, the application of the forum state's laws
to activities carried on elsewhere. There are several theories un-
der which a state can seek to prescribe laws governing extraterri-
torial conduct, 3 but the most important one for our purposes is
the theory that a state is justified in regulating conduct produc-
ing harmful "effects" within its territory.34 The widespread accep-
33 Possible bases for a state's assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction, beyond the
effects principle discussed in the text, include the universality principle, which permits a
state to enforce sanctions against crimes that have an independent basis in international
law (such as genocide or hijacking of aircraft), see Restatement (Third) of Foreign Rela-
tions Law § 404 (1987); United States v Yunis, 924 F2d 1086, 1091 (DC Cir 1991) (holding
that the court had jurisdiction over hijacking of aircraft pursuant to the universality prin-
ciple); the nationality principle, which permits a state to regulate the conduct of its na-
tionals wherever they are, see Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 402(2)
comment e (1987) ("a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to . . the activi-
ties, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as within its territory");
and the protective principle, which allows a state to regulate extraterritorial activities
that threaten its local security, id at § 402(3) comment f ("a state has jurisdiction to pre-
scribe law with respect to ... certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its na-
tionals that is directed against the security of the state or against a limited class of other
state interests"). Finally, the passive personality theory would allow a state to exercise
jurisdiction over anyone who injures one of its nationals. Id at § 402 comment g. This
theory is the most controversial of the bases for extraterritorial jurisdiction. Jimmy Gu-
ruld, Complex Criminal Litigation: Prosecuting Drug Enterprises and Organized Crime
471 (Lexis 2d ed 1996). See also Jordan J. Paust, Federal Jurisdiction Over Extraterrito-
rial Acts of Terrorism and Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of International Law under
the FSIA and the Act of State Doctrine, 23 Va J Intl L 191, 202 (1983) (noting that the
United States does not recognize the passive personality principle and questioning
whether more than a handful of nations accept its validity). The United States has, how-
ever, relied on this theory as the basis for exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction for terror-
ism-related crimes. See GurulM, Complex Criminal Litigation at 472-73 (cited in note 33)
(discussing federal statutes relying on passive personality principle).
34 See, for example, Strassheim v Daily, 221 US 280, 285 (1911) ("Acts done outside a
jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a
State in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the effect .... );
Hartford Fire Insurance Co v California, 509 US 764, 796 (1993) (recognizing applicability
of the Sherman Antitrust Act to "foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in
fact produce some substantial effect in the United States"); Rivard v United States, 375
F2d 882, 887 (5th Cir 1967) ("All the nations of the world recognize the principle that a
man who outside of a country willfully puts in motion a force to take effect in it is answer-
able at the place where the evil is done .... ) (internal quotation marks omitted); Gold-
smith, 65 U Chi L Rev at 1208 (cited in note 30) (noting that customary international law
and the United States Constitution permit extraterritorial jurisdiction over "behavior with
substantial local effects"); Gurul6, Complex Criminal Litigation at 455 (cited in note 33)
(describing the "widely accepted principle of international law" that a sovereign must be
able to protect itself from injury, including from acts committed outside its borders that
are intended to have detrimental effects within its territory); Paust, 23 Va J Intl L at 203-
08 (1983) (cited in note 33) (explaining when a nation may extend jurisdiction to acts
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tance of such a power is a relatively recent phenomenon. Until
the early 20th century, there was little reason for states to assert
such a power, because conduct in one country rarely had effects
in another. In 1909, in the well known American Banana deci-
sion, Justice Holmes captured the view that a state lacked juris-
diction to apply its law to extraterritorial conduct: "[T]he charac-
ter of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by
the law of the country where the act is done." 5 Dramatic devel-
opments in the economy and technology led to the abandonment
of this view," and by 1945 Judge Learned Hand found it to be
committed abroad but having effects within its territory); Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law § 402(1)(c) (1987) ("a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to
... conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within
its territory").
The effects principle is often treated as an application of the so-called "objective
territorial" principle. Under the objective territorial principle, a country has jurisdiction
over conduct, a constituent element of which occurs within its territory. See Ian Brownlie,
Principles of Public International Law 304 (Clarendon 5th ed 1998) (describing objective
territorial principle). Some commentators, however, treat the effects principle as distinct
from the objective territorial principle, on the theory that an exercise ofjurisdiction under
the latter principle is not an instance of "extraterritorial" jurisdiction at all, in that an
element of the conduct occurs within the territory of the regulating state. See Jennings
and Watts, eds, I Oppenheim's International Law at 472-73 n 37 (cited in note 27) (noting
that distinction between effects principle and objective application of the territorial prin-
ciple "has not always been fully appreciated").
35 American Banana Co v United Fruit Co, 213 US 347, 356 (1909).
36 For arguments that developments in the economy and technology led to the aban-
donment of the strict territorial view, see Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Private Attorney Gen-
eral in a Global Age: Public Interests in Private International Antitrust Litigation, 26 Yale
J Intl L 219, 227-28 (2001) (arguing that in commercial law areas, strict territorialism
"proved ill-suited to dealing with the expansion of international commerce"); Stein, 32 Intl
Law at 1169 (cited in note 30) ("As people and transactions became more mobile, jurisdic-
tional rules based solely on the current location of the defendant were strained); Jonathan
Turley, "When in Rome": Multinational Misconduct and the Presumption against Extrater-
ritoriality, 84 Nw U L Rev 598, 609 (1990) (suggesting that "greater transnational com-
merce following World War I" led to abandonment of the strict territorial rule); R.Y.
Jennings, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust Laws, 33 Brit YB
Intl L 146, 150 (1957) (noting that the strict territorial view "belonged perhaps to the days
when communications and travel were still comparatively difficult. In our present
shrunken world such a strictly territorial division of jurisdiction may, it can be suggested,
be unworkable").
Movement in the United States away from the American Banana view can be seen
as early as 1911, when the Supreme Court, without discussion, applied the Sherman Anti-
trust Act to contracts executed in England between American companies and an English
company to restrain imports to and exports from the United States. United States v
American Tobacco Co, 221 US 106, 171-72 (1911). Since American companies were parties
to the agreements, jurisdiction did not rest solely on the effects of the agreements. By
1927, the Supreme Court's movement away from the American Banana view was more
pronounced. See United States v Sisal Sales Corp, 274 US 268, 276 (1927) (applying the
Sherman Antitrust Act to "a contract, combination, or conspiracy" between American
corporations and a Mexican company to control Mexican sisal exports; concluding that
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"settled law ... that any state may impose liabilities, even on
persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders
that has consequences within its borders."37 Although countries
initially objected to the United States's application of its economic
regulations, such as antitrust laws, to extraterritorial conduct,38
the principle that a state can prescribe laws governing conduct
causing harmful effects within its territory is now generally ac-
cepted.39
Although a state may have jurisdiction to prescribe rules lim-
iting certain extraterritorial conduct, it generally may not enforce
its law-whether through actions of its courts or actions of its
executive officials--outside of its territory. As the Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law explains, "A state's law en-
forcement officers may exercise their functions in the territory of
another state only with the consent of the other state, given by
jurisdiction was proper based in part on the fact that "deliberate acts, here and elsewhere
... brought about forbidden results within the United States").
37 United States v Aluminum Co of America, 148 F2d 416, 443 (2d Cir 1945) ("Alcoa")
(holding that Sherman Antitrust Act applies extraterritorially). The court of appeals de-
cided the Alcoa case under a statute permitting the Supreme Court to refer a case to a
court of appeals for a final decision if the Court could not gather a quorum. As the Su-
preme Court itself has recognized, the special circumstances under which the case was
decided 'add to its weight as precedent." American Tobacco Co v United States, 328 US
781, 811 (1946) (endorsing the reasoning of the Alcoa case).
38 See, for example, Roger P. Alford, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust
Laws: The United States and European Community Approaches, 33 Va J Intl L 1, 9 (1992)
(noting that, in the antitrust context, the effects doctrine "generally was met with disap-
proval from abroad"); Jennings and Watts, eds, I Oppenheim's International Law at 475
(cited in note 27) (noting concern of other states with the United States's broad application
of the effects doctrine).
39 Although the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law recognizes various
bases for exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction, it provides that a state should exercise
such jurisdiction only where it is "reasonable" to do so. Restatement § 403(1) (1987) ("Even
when one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402 is present, a state may not exercise
jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having connections with
another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable."). The Restatement's
approach has not been followed consistently in U.S. courts, compare Hartford Fire Insur-
ance Co, 509 US at 798-99 (rejecting a claim that the Court should decline to exercise
jurisdiction under Sherman Antitrust Act on comity grounds), with Timberlane Lumber
Co v Bank of America, 549 F2d 597, 613-14 (9th Cir 1976) (discussing factors to be consid-
ered in determining reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction), and may not reflect a re-
quirement of international law. See, for example, Phillip R. Trimble, Editorial Comment,
The Supreme Court and International Law: The Demise of Restatement Section 403, 89 Am
J Intl L 53, 55-57 (1995) (discussing how U.S. state practice and the Supreme Court have
declined to follow § 403); Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads:
An Intersection Between Public and Private International Law, 76 Am J Intl L 280, 294
(1982) (discussing § 40 of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law, the prede-
cessor to § 403 of the Third Restatement).
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duly authorized officials of that state."40 In the criminal context,
then, customary international law generally prohibits law en-
forcement officials from one country from exercising their func-
tions-such as conducting searches or making arrests-in the
territory of another state without that state's permission.4' Wit-
40 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 432(2) (1987). See also The Case of
the S.S. "Lotus," 1927 P C I J (ser A) No 10 at 18 ("[Tlhe first and foremost restriction
imposed by international law upon a State is that the existence of a permissive rule to the
contrary, it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another state.");
Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law at 310 (cited in note 34) ("The governing
principle is that a state cannot take measures on the territory of another state by way of
enforcement of national laws without the consent of the latter."); Jennings and Watts, eds,
I Oppenheim's International Law at 385-86 (cited in note 27) (illustrating activities that
constitute a breach of a state's "duty not to violate another state's independence or territo-
rial or personal authority," including "carry[ing] out official investigations in foreign terri-
tory"); H. Lauterpacht, ed, I Oppenheim's International Law 327-28 (Longmans 8th ed
1955) ("It follows from the principle of territorial supremacy that States must not perform
acts of sovereignty within the territory of other States."); id at 295:
The duty to respect the territorial supremacy of a foreign State must pre-
vent a State from performing acts which, although they are according to
its personal supremacy within its competence, would violate the territo-
rial supremacy of this foreign State. A State must not perform acts of
sovereignty in the territory of another State.
41 Principles of self-defense may justify certain breaches of another state's territorial
integrity. Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, for example, recognizes an "in-
herent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations." Charter of the United Nations Art 51, 59 Stat 1031,
Treaty Ser No 993 (1945). See also Jennings and Watts, eds, I Oppenheim's International
Law at 421 (cited in note 27) ("The justification of self-defence for action which involves
the violation of another state's territory is an exception to the general duty of all states to
respect the territorial sovereignty of other states."). There is, however considerable debate
about the range of circumstances in which a state can invoke the self-defense exception.
For a broad view of the scope of the exception, including an argument that the exception
may permit law enforcement officials to take certain actions in response to narcotics traf-
ficking activities on the theory that they present an "increasingly serious threat to the
domestic security of the United States," see FBI Authority to Seize Suspects Abroad,
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong, 1st Sess 37 (1989) (statement of Abraham D. Sofaer,
Legal Adviser, United States Department of State). For a narrower view, suggesting that
the exception only applies "in the context of invasion and national survival," see Jonathan
A. Bush, How Did We Get Here? Foreign Abduction After Alvarez-Machain, 45 Stan L Rev
939, 981 (1993):
[Slelf-defense, under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter or other in-
ternational law, has never been interpreted as a license to use lesser lev-
els of force in the pursuit of strongly sought ends, however virtuous ....
The self-defense justification applies in the context of invasion and na-
tional survival, not as an attempt to ensure individual accountability for
foreign crimes.
See also Jennings and Watts, eds, I Oppenheim's International Law at 421 (cited in note
27) ("Like all exceptions, [the self-defense exception] is to be strictly applied."). But com-
pare Malvina Halberstam, In Defense of the Supreme Court Decision in Alvarez-Machain,
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ness, for example, the international outcry when the United
States, in investigating the murder of Drug Enforcement Agency
agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar, kidnapped a defendant in
Mexico in order to bring him to trial in the United States.4 ' The
gap between a state's power to prescribe rules and its power to
enforce them may arise even when a state seeks evidence related
to activities within its own territory but located abroad. Such dif-
ficulties are more likely, however, when a state is investigating
extraterritorial conduct.
States have dealt with this gap between their ability to pre-
scribe laws governing extraterritorial conduct and their ability to
investigate such conduct through a variety of legal assistance
mechanisms. I survey these mechanisms below, with specific fo-
cus on the example of the United States.
86 Am J Intl L 736 n 5 (1992) (stating that self-defense principles may justify certain
breaches of territorial integrity, including forcible abductions, but confining the argument
to circumstances in which a state suspects an individual is involved in terrorist acts).
42 For discussion of the facts surrounding the U.S. actions, see United States v Alva-
rez-Machain, 504 US 655, 657-58 (1992) (discussing the Alvarez-Machain abduction);
Abraham Abramovsky, Extraterritorial Abductions: America's "Catch and Snatch" Policy
Run Amok, 31 Va J Intl L 151, 161-70 (1991) (describing tactics used during the Cama-
rena investigation and multiple abductions by the United States). For discussion of the
international reaction, see, for example, Jimmy Gurul6, Terrorism, Territorial Sover-
eignty, and the Forcible Apprehension of International Criminals Abroad, 17 Hastings Intl
& Comp L Rev 457, 458 n 6 (1994) (noting that several Latin American countries ques-
tioned the international juridical validity of Alvarez-Machain and its impact on treaties,
and that the Canadian Minister of External Affairs stated that a U.S. attempt to kidnap
someone from Canada would be seen as a criminal act). Although some of the outcry
against the U.S. seizure of Alvarez-Machain was based on the claimed violation of an
extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico, see Brief of the Government of
Canada as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 2-4, United States v Alvarez-
Machain, 504 US 655 (1992) (No 91-712, filed Mar 4, 1992); Brief for the United Mexican
States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance at 2-5, United States v. Alvarez-
Machain, 504 US 655 (1992) (No 91-712, filed Mar 5, 1992), much of it was based on the
view that the unconsented arrest violated customary international law, see Brief of the
Government of Canada at 4, 5 (arguing that under the law, customs and usages of nations,
official abductions are unlawful); Brief for the United Mexican States at 10-12 (arguing
that sovereign equality and territorial integrity are fundamental to an international legal
order). Even contemporaneous statements of U.S. government officials support that view.
See Authority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to Override Customary or Other In-
ternational Law in the Course of Extraterritorial Law Enforcement Activities, 13 Op Office
Legal Counsel 163, 170-71 (1989) (discussing whether Congress and the Executive can
override limitations imposed by customary international law); FBI Authority to Seize
Suspects Abroad at 11-12 (cited in note 41) (statement of William P. Barr, Assistant At-
torney General, Office of Legal Counsel, United States Department of Justice) (same); id
at 32-38 (statement of Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State)
(acknowledging that the principle of territorial integrity bars states from conducting law
enforcement activities in the territory of other states, but stating that some breaches of
territorial integrity may be justified on the grounds of self-defense).
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B. Development of Legal Assistance Mechanisms
Historically, countries seeking evidence from other states
relied on formal "letters rogatory" in both civil and criminal mat-
ters. Letters rogatory are requests for evidence issued by a court
in one country, transmitted through diplomatic channels and
seeking the assistance of a court in another country. 3 These let-
ters, however, have limited use. Because courts may issue letters
rogatory only in pending cases, from the perspective of the United
States they cannot be used to obtain foreign evidence before the
grand jury stage of a criminal proceeding.44 In addition, states
honor letters rogatory only as a matter of comity 5 and often pro-
vide the requested evidence after a substantial delay.4"
The limits of letters rogatory prompted countries to develop
other methods of securing evidence in criminal matters. First,
countries have entered into a variety of multilateral and bilateral
arrangements containing procedures for obtaining and providing
legal assistance in criminal matters. The first major legal assis-
tance treaty, the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters, entered into force in 1962. 47 Its signatories un-
dertook "to afford each other ... the widest measure of mutual
assistance" in investigating criminal offenses.4" Although the
treaty contemplated that states would request assistance through
letters rogatory, with limited exceptions it obligated the parties to
carry out such requests. 9 The European experience spurred the
43 See Marjorie M. Whiteman, 6 Digest of International Law 204 (Dept of State 1968).
44 See Michael Abbell and Bruno A. Ristau, 3 International Judicial Assistance § 12-3-
3(2) at 86 (Intl Law Institute 1990 & Supp 1997) (noting the limited use of letters rogatory
in criminal investigations and cases). Letters rogatory can, however, be used to obtain
evidence at the grand jury stage. See, for example, United States v Reagan, 453 F2d 165,
171-73 (6th Cir 1971).
45 Whiteman, 6 International Law at 204 (cited in note 43) ("such request being made,
and being usually granted, by reason of the comity existing between nations in ordinary
peaceful times").
46 Abbell and Ristau, 3 International Judicial Assistance § 12-3-3(2) at 87 (cited in
note 44) (noting that the circuitous system of using letters rogatory creates significant
delays); Jordan J. Paust, et al, International Criminal Law: Cases and Materials 551
(Carolina 2d ed 2000) (describing the multi-stage process and noting it can take three to
six months to complete). See also Alan Ellis and Robert L. Pisani, The United States Trea-
ties on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, in M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed, 2 International
Criminal Law 403, 403 (Transnational 2d ed 1999).
47 European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 472 UN Treaty
Ser 185 (1962).
48 Id at Art 1, 472 UN Treaty Ser at 186.
49 See id at Art 3, 472 UN Treaty Ser at 192 (providing that the requested party
"shall" execute letters rogatory); id at Art 2, 472 UN Treaty Ser at 186, 192 (setting forth
grounds for refusing a request); David McLean, International Judicial Assistance 133-34
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United States to develop bilateral agreements containing similar
obligations." In 1968, the United States entered into negotiations
with Switzerland that culminated in the signing of the first bilat-
eral mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) in 1973.5' The United
States currently has MLATs in force with more than forty coun-
tries.52 All U.S. MLATs obligate the parties to designate a "cen-
(Clarendon 1992) (explaining the procedures under the Convention for use of letters roga-
tory).
50 See Ellis and Pisani, United States Treaties at 412 (cited in note 46) (discussing the
role played by the Convention in the United States developing similar bilateral agree-
ments).
51 See Treaty with the Swiss Confederation on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Mat-
ters, Senate Executive Report 94-29, 94th Cong, 2d Sess 1 (1976); Treaty on Mutual Assis-
tance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Switzerland, 27 UST 2019, TIAS No 8302 (1977).
52 In addition to the Swiss treaty, see Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal
Matters with Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, and St. Lucia, Senate Treaty Doc
105-24, 105th Cong, 1st Sess (1997) (U.S.-Antigua and Barbuda, entered into force July 1,
1999); Treaty with Argentina on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Senate
Treaty Doc 102-18, 102d Cong, 1st Sess (1991) ("U.S.-Argentina Treaty") (U.S.-Argentina,
entered into force Feb 9, 1993); Treaty with Australia on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters, Senate Treaty Doc 105-27, 105th Cong, 1st Sess (1997) (U.S.-Australia, entered
into force Sept 30, 1999); Treaty with Austria on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal
Matters, Senate Treaty Doc 104-21, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (1995) (U.S.-Austria, entered
into force Aug 1, 1998); Treaty with the Bahamas on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Mat-
ters, Senate Treaty Doc 100-17, 100th Cong, 2d Sess (1988) (U.S.-Bahamas, entered into
force July 18, 1990); Treaty with Barbados on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Mat-
ters, Senate Treaty Doc 105-23, 105th Cong, 1st Sess (1997) (U.S.-Barbados, entered into
force Mar 3, 2000); Treaty with Belgium on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters,
Senate Treaty Doc 100-16, 100th Cong, 2d Sess (1988) (U.S.-Belgium, entered into force
Jan 1, 2000); Treaty with Brazil on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Senate
Treaty Doc 105-42, 105th Cong, 2d Sess (1998) (U.S.-Brazil, entered into force Feb 21,
2001); Treaty with Canada on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Senate
Treaty Doc 100-14, 100th Cong, 2d Sess (1988) (U.S.-Canada, entered into force Jan 24,
1990); Treaty with the United Kingdom Concerning the Cayman Islands Relating to Mu-
tual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Senate Treaty Doc 100-8, 100th Cong, 1st Sess
(1987) (U.S.-U.K., concerning the Cayman Islands, entered into force Mar 19, 1990);
Treaty with the Czech Republic on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Senate
Treaty Doc 105-47, 105th Cong, 2d Sess (1998) (U.S.-Czech Republic, entered into force
May 7, 2000); Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters with Antigua and
Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, and St. Lucia, Senate Treaty Doc 105-24, 105th Cong, 1st
Sess (1997) (U.S.-Dominica, entered into force May 25, 2000); Treaty with Estonia on
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Senate Treaty Doc 105-52, 105th Cong, 2d
Sess (1998) (U.S.-Estonia, entered into force Oct 20, 2000); Treaty with France on Mutual
Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Senate Treaty Doc 106-17, 106th Cong, 2d Sess
(2000) (U.S.-France, entered into force Dec 1, 2001); Treaty with Greece on Mutual Legal
Assistance in Criminal Matters, Senate Treaty Doc 106-18, 106th Cong, 2d Sess (2000)
(U.S.-Greece, entered into force Nov 20, 2001); Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in
Criminal Matters with Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, and St. Lucia, Senate
Treaty Doc 105-24, 105th Cong, 1st Sess (1997) (U.S.-Grenada, entered into force Sept 14,
1999); Treaty with Hong Kong on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Senate
Treaty Doc 105-6, 105th Cong, 1st Sess (1997) (U.S.-Hong Kong, entered into force Jan 21,
2000); Treaty with Hungary on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Senate
Treaty Doc 104-20, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (1995) (U.S.-Hungary, entered into force Mar 18,
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tral authority" to expeditiously process assistance requests; the
requested country can only refuse assistance on the grounds
1997); Treaty with Israel on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Senate Treaty
Doc 105-40, 105th Cong, 2d Sess (1998) (U.S.-Israel, entered into force May 25, 1999);
Treaty with the Italian Republic on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Senate
Treaty Doc 98-25, 98th Cong, 2d Sess (1984) ("U.S.-Italy Treaty") (U.S.-Italy, entered into
force Nov 13, 1985); Treaty with Jamaica on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Mat-
ters, Senate Treaty Doc 102-16, 102d Cong, 1st Sess (1991) (U.S.-Jamaica, entered into
force July 25, 1995); Treaty with Latvia on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters,
Senate Treaty Doc 105-34, 105th Cong, 2d Sess (1998) (U.S.-Latvia, entered into force
Sept 17, 1999); Treaty with Lithuania on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters,
Senate Treaty Doc 105-41, 105th Cong, 2d Sess (1998) (U.S.-Lithuania, entered into force
Aug 26, 1999); Treaty with Luxembourg on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters,
Senate Treaty Doc 105-11, 105th Cong, 1st Sess (1997) (U.S. -Luxembourg, entered into
force Feb 1, 2001); Mutual Legal Assistance Cooperation Treaty with Mexico, Senate
Treaty Doc 100-13, 100th Cong, 2d Sess (1987) (U.S.-Mexico, entered into force May 3,
1991); Convention with the Kingdom of Morocco on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Mat-
ters, Senate Treaty Doc 98-24, 98th Cong, 2d Sess (1984) (U.S.-Morocco, entered into force
June 23, 1993); Treaty with the Netherlands on Judicial Assistance: Criminal Investiga-
tions, 35 UST 1361, TIAS No 10734 (1981) (U.S.-Netherlands, entered into force Sept 15,
1983); Treaty with Panama on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Senate
Treaty Doc 102-15, 102d Cong, 1st Sess (1991) (U.S.-Panama, entered into force Sept 6,
1995); Treaty with the Philippines on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Sen-
ate Treaty Doc 104-18, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (1995) (U.S.-Philippines, entered into force
Nov 22, 1996); Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with Poland, Senate Treaty Doc 105-12,
105th Cong, 1st Sess (1997) (U.S.-Poland, entered into force Sept 17, 1999); Treaty with
Romania on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Senate Treaty Doc 106-20,
106th Cong, 2d Sess (2000) (U.S.-Romania, entered into force Oct 17, 2001); Treaty with
St. Kitts and Nevis on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Senate Treaty Doc
105-37, 105th Cong, 2d Sess (1998) (U.S.-St. Kitts and Nevis, entered into force Feb 23,
2000); Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters with Antigua and Bar-
buda, Dominica, Grenada, and St. Lucia, Senate Treaty Doc 105-24, 105th Cong, 1st Sess
(1997) (U.S.-St. Lucia, entered into force Feb 2, 2000); Treaty with St. Vincent and the
Grenadines on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Senate Treaty Doc 105-44,
105th Cong, 2d Sess (1998) (U.S.-St. Vincent and the Grenadines, entered into force Sept
8, 1999); Treaty with South Africa on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Sen-
ate Treaty Doc 106-26, 106th Cong, 2d Sess (2000) (U.S.-South Africa, entered into force
June 25, 2001); Treaty with the Republic of Korea on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal
Matters, Senate Treaty Doc 104-1, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (1995) (U.S.-South Korea, entered
into force May 23, 1997); Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters between
the Kingdom of Spain and the United States of America, official 1730 UN Treaty Ser 113
(1990) ("U.S.-Spain Treaty") (U.S.-Spain, entered into fbrce June 30, 1993); Treaty with
Thailand on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Senate Treaty Doc 100-18, 100th
Cong, 2d Sess (1988) (U.S.-Thailand, entered into force June 10, 1993); Treaty on Mutual
Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters with Trinidad and Tobago, Senate Treaty Doc 105-
22, 105th Cong, 1st Sess (1997) (U.S.-Trinidad and Tobago, entered into force Nov 29,
1999); Treaty with Turkey on Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 32
UST 3111, TIAS No 9891 (1979) (U.S.-Turkey, entered into force Jan 1, 1981); Treaty with
Ukraine on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Senate Treaty Doc 106-16,
106th Cong, 1st Sess (1999) (U.S.-Ukraine, entered into force Feb 27, 2001); Treaty with
the United Kingdom on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Senate Treaty Doc
104-2, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (1995) (U.S.-U.K, entered into force Dec 2, 1996); Treaty with
Uruguay on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Senate Treaty Doc 102-19,
102d Cong, 1st Sess (1991) (U.S.-Uruguay, entered into force Apr 15, 1994).
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specified in the treaty. 3 The treaties generally require the re-
quested state to locate persons believed to be in its territory, to
execute requests for searches and seizures, to compel a witness's
appearance and production of documents, and to produce records
in the government's possession.54 The treaties ordinarily also pro-
vide that states must execute requests in a manner consistent
with their own laws.5 Thus, for example, if a foreign country re-
quests that U.S. officials conduct a search within the United
States, the officials must meet the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment and other applicable U.S. law.
In addition to country-specific MLATs, the United States has
entered into a number of offense-specific treaties and executive
agreements containing legal assistance provisions. Two of the
earliest agreements, the Hague Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft56 and the Montreal Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation,57 obligate states in general terms to provide "the great-
est measure of assistance in connection with criminal proceedings
brought" in connection with offenses covered by the conventions.58
The more recent Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances59 contains more detailed legal
assistance provisions." Like most bilateral MLATs, the Conven-
tion requires signatories to execute searches and seizures, to
serve judicial documents and to produce relevant records. 1 The
United States has also entered into a variety of tax treaties and
executive agreements obligating the parties to exchange such in-
formation as is pertinent or necessary to prevent evasion of in-
53 The treaties ordinarily permit a party to refuse to honor a request if the request for
assistance relates to a political offense or an offense "under military law which would not
be an offense under ordinary criminal law" or the execution of the request would prejudice
the "security" or "essential interests" of the requested state. See, for example, US-
Argentina Treaty at Art 3(1) (cited in note 52).
54 See, for example, U.S.-Italy Treaty at Arts 1, 14-15 (cited in note 52) (establishing
obligations to render assistance and procedures for taking testimony from witnesses).
55 See, for example, U.S.-Spain Treaty at Art 5(3) (cited in note 52).
56 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 22 UST
1641, TIAS No 7192 (1970) ("Unlawful Aircraft Seizure Convention").
57 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Civil Aviation (Sabotage), 10 ILM 1151 (1971) ("Civil Aviation Safety Convention").
58 Unlawful Aircraft Seizure Convention, Art 10, $ 1, 22 UST at 1647 (cited in note
56); Civil Aviation Safety Convention, Art 11, $ 1, 10 ILM at 1155 (cited in note 57).
59 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotro-
pic Substances, UN Doc E/CONF 82/15 (1988), reprinted in 28 ILM 493 (1989).
60 Id.
61 Id at Art 7(2), reprinted in 28 ILM at 508-09.
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come taxes.62 Finally, the United States has entered into nonre-
ciprocal agreements with certain bank secrecy jurisdictions-that
is, territories with laws providing sufficient protection of bank
records as to attract deposits in connection with illegal activities,
such as narcotics trafficking. Under these agreements, such ju-
risdictions must produce and authenticate documentary evi-
dence. 3
All of the mechanisms described above obligate states to pro-
vide legal assistance to another country in the early phase of an
investigation-that is, before a state begins a prosecution against
a specific target. Cooperation at the police level may supplement
these agreements. The United States is one Of 178 members of
the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), an or-
ganization that routes requests for police-level assistance from
one country to another and facilitates cooperation in combating
international crime. 4 In addition, the United States transmits a
significant number of requests for investigative information from
other countries through Federal Bureau of Investigation or Drug
Enforcement Agency legal attach6s or liaisons stationed at em-
bassies and consulates abroad. Finally, officials from two coun-
tries may agree to conduct a joint investigation of conduct that
took place in one country but violated both countries' laws. Even
when no violation of its own law has taken place, a country may
assist or supervise foreign officials in conducting an investigation
within its territory.6
62 See generally Abbell and Ristau, 3 International Judicial Assistance § 12-3-6 at
101-08 (cited in note 44).
63 See id § 12-3-5 at 95-97 (explaining the type of information available under these
agreements and the lack of reciprocity).
64 See generally About Interpol: The Fundamental Principles of Interpol, available
online at <http://www.interpol.int/Public/icpo/Guide/principles.asp> (visited Jan 25, 2001)
[on file with U Chi Legal F]. For a discussion of U.S. involvement in Interpol, see Ethan A.
Nadelmann, Cops Across Borders: The Internationalization of U.S. Criminal Law En-
forcement 181-86 (Pennsylvania 1993) (discussing the development of U.S. involvement in
Interpol).
65 Nadelmann, Cops Across Borders at 147-60 (cited in note 64).
66 Abbell and Ristau, 3 International Judicial Assistance § 12-3-1 at 82-83 (cited in
note 44). For examples of joint investigations, see United States v Barona, 56 F3d 1087,
1089-90, 1094 (9th Cir 1995) (holding that in a drug distribution investigation, Danish
wiretaps constituted a "joint venture," considering that American agents requested wire-
taps and were involved in decoding transmissions and interpreting their relevance);
United States v Peterson, 812 F2d 486, 490 (9th Cir 1987) (finding that narcotics investi-
gations between the United States and the Philippines was a "joint venture" when United
States authorities believed marijuana was destined for the United States and assumed a
substantial role).
[2001:
CHASING BITS ACROSS BORDERS
C. Legal Assistance in Computer Crime Cases
As this discussion illustrates, cooperative arrangements obli-
gating states to assist one another in investigations touching
more than one jurisdiction are now widespread. These traditional
arrangements, however, are unlikely to prove effective in com-
puter crime investigations.
As online activities become more widespread, more evidence
will take electronic form. That fact alone may make it difficult for
investigating officials to gather the evidence they seek: evidence
in electronic form is fleeting in nature, and gathering it may re-
quire a technical expertise that many officials lack. 7 The fact
that computer systems cut across international boundaries
makes the matter even more complicated. Law enforcement offi-
cials attempting to use traditional legal assistance mechanisms
to obtain evidence in computer crime cases will encounter two
problems. First, more and more evidence will be located across
international borders. An overseas gambling operation targeting
local users, for example, would likely keep its database of user
IDs and passwords on an overseas server. Digital images of child
pornography might be stored in one state but viewed in another;
even an investigation of the local user might require access to the
images stored on the foreign server as well as connection data not
readily available to the investigating state." A foreign hacker
might gain access to a local computer by using one or many for-
eign computer systems as staging points; tracing the hacker's
route would require securing data available only from those for-
eign systems.69
Although transnational crimes are becoming more common
even outside of the computer context, cases in which evidence is
primarily located abroad still remain the exception rather than
the rule. In computer crime cases, a country with a strong inter-
est in investigating a transaction will often find that crucial evi-
67 See Report of the President's Working Group on Unlawful Conduct on the Internet,
The Electronic Frontier: The Challenge of Unlawful Conduct Involving the Use of the
Internet 27 (Mar 2000), available online at <http://www.cybercrime.gov/unlawful.pdf>
(visited Sept 14, 2000) [on file with U Chi Legal F] (cited in note 11) (noting the complex-
ity and rapid technological changes involved in computer crime cases and emphasizing the
need for specialists dedicated to investigating and prosecuting such crimes).
68 See Crackdown on Net Child Porn, CNET News.com (cited in note 18) (noting the
arrest of one hundred people in twelve different countries following the seizure of images
in the United States).
69 See Canada Broadens Its Case Against Suspected Hacker, NY Times C5 (Aug 4,
2000) (noting that a Canadian hacker used computers in the United States and Korea in
his attacks).
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dence is beyond its borders. Indeed, evidence may be stored
across international borders even when a crime has no other in-
ternational element. Consider the simplest case-where law en-
forcement officials seek to obtain evidence that is stored on a
computer. For papers to be useful in crime, they generally must
be physically located near the criminal. Electronic information, in
contrast, need not be physically stored nearby in order to be use-
ful to a criminal. The physical location of electronic evidence
therefore often depends upon the fortuity of network architecture:
an American subsidiary of a French corporation may house all of
its data on a server that is physically located in France; two
Japanese citizens might subscribe to America Online and have
their electronic mail stored on AOL's Virginia servers. ° Alterna-
tively, a criminal might deliberately store files on a foreign server
to take advantage of the privacy protections of an off-shore data
haven.7 Traditional cooperative arrangements do not contem-
plate evidence of domestic crime routinely being found only
abroad.
The second problem that law enforcement officials relying on
traditional legal assistance arrangements will face is that elec-
tronic evidence can so easily be lost or destroyed. Electronic evi-
dence located in one country may be readily accessible to a crimi-
nal in another, who can remove, alter, or destroy the evidence
with a few keystrokes from thousands of miles away. The United
States has defended FBI agents' recent cross-border search of
data on Russian servers in part on the ground that data other-
wise would have been lost.72 Even when evidence is not deliber-
ately destroyed, it might be unavailable after a short period.
Suppose, for example, that a hacker seeks to extract proprietary
information from a corporate computer system linked to the
internet. Investigating officials may find that the attack origi-
nates from a computer outside of the United States and may seek
information from a foreign internet service provider. The investi-
gating officials may secure the cooperation of foreign officials in
contacting the service provider, only to find that the provider's
70 Sussmann, 9 Duke J Comp & Intl L at 470-71 (cited in note 11) (noting how corpo-
rate data is usually maintained at company headquarters and explaining the structure of
AOL's network).
71 See, for example, Jonathan I. Edelstein, Note, Anonymity and International Law
Enforcement in Cyberspace, 7 Fordham Intel Prop, Media & Enter L J 231, 265-67 (1996)
(discussing the possibility of countries using anonymous remailers and computer secrecy
laws to create such data havens for criminals).
72 See Carter, E-Sting Nets 2 Russian Hackers, Seattle Times at Al (cited in note 23)
(reporting assistant U.S. attorney's claim that investigators feared destruction of data).
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system no longer holds the relevant information. Because tradi-
tional cooperative arrangements require time to execute requests
for assistance, they are likely to be ineffective with respect to evi-
dence that is fleeting.
Because widespread use of the internet increases the likeli-
hood that electronic evidence will be physically located outside of
the boundaries of the investigating state-beyond the reach of
investigating officials but accessible to and capable of being de-
leted by the target of the investigation-unlawful conduct involv-
ing computers creates new legal challenges for cooperation among
domestic and foreign law enforcement officials. No matter how
effectively states streamline current international legal assis-
tance procedures, it is unlikely that governments relying exclu-
sively on such mechanisms can be assured of seizing electronic
evidence located within another jurisdiction. In the next Part, I
explore state responses to these challenges.
II. MOVING BEYOND TRADITIONAL LEGAL
ASSISTANCE MECHANISMS
The difficulties that law enforcement officials have in coping
with electronic evidence have prompted states to move beyond
traditional legal assistance arrangements in computer crime
cases. In negotiations in two multilateral organizations, countries
have considered adopting domestic measures that would require
internet service providers and other entities to rapidly preserve
data based on requests from foreign states. First, in October
1999, the Group of Eight industrialized nations ("G-8")73 adopted
certain principles relating to cross-border access to stored com-
puter data.74 Under these principles, each state "shall ensure" its
ability to secure rapid preservation of data stored in a computer
system within its territory when another state requests such
preservation. 5 The principles contemplate that a foreign state
will follow its request for rapid preservation of such data with a
formal legal assistance request to search, seize, copy, or disclose
73 The G-8 includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
74 See Ministerial Conference of the G-8 Countries on Combating Transnational Or-
ganized Crime Communiqug annex 1 (Moscow, Oct 19-20, 1999) [on file with U Chi Legal
F].
75 Id at annex 1 1-3 (establishing the rights and duties of member States in the
preservation of data stored in a computer system).
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the data.76 Second, member states of the Council of Europe
(COE),77 with the United States participating as an observer,
have also considered requiring providers to preserve data on be-
half of foreign states. The COE's Committee of Ministers recently
adopted a Convention on Cyber-Crime that, among other things,
would require states to "adopt such legislative and other meas-
ures as may be necessary to enable its competent authorities to
order or similarly obtain the expeditious preservation" of stored
computer data, including "traffic" data concerning the origin,
path, and destination of a communication,78 in response to a re-
quest from a foreign state.79 Under the Convention's procedures,
the state seeking the preserved data would request its disclosure,
and the target state would obtain the data in a manner consistent
with its law.8" The Convention would also obligate parties to as-
sist one another in obtaining stored content and in collecting traf-
fic data and content in real time."'
Although these multilateral efforts to expand cooperation in
computer crime investigations have met with much criticism,
particularly in the United States, on the ground that they would
impermissibly expand the reach of national police authorities and
threaten privacy,82 they in fact represent a relatively modest
76 Id at annex 1 4 (establishing that states receiving requests for "access, search,
copying, seizure or disclosure of data" must execute requests as "expeditiously as possi-
ble").
77 The Council of Europe is an intergovernmental organization with 43 member
states.
78 Convention on Cyber-Crime at Art 16 (cited in note 26) (defining "traffic data").
79 Id at Arts 29(1), 29(3). Final approval by the COE's Committee of Ministers opens
the Convention for signature and ratification by participating states.
80 Id at Art 29(3).
81 Id at Arts 31, 33, 34.
82 See, for example, Bryan Brumley, Cybercrime Treaty Raises Concern, AP Online
(Oct 27, 2000), available at 2000 WL 28616521 (stating that groups criticize the treaty for
broad powers it gives governments to collect information on citizens); James Evans, Euro-
pean Cyber-Crime Proposal Blasted, e-Business World, available online at <http://www.e-
businessworld.com/Englishcrd_council_470984.html> (visited Apr 3, 2001) (noting opposi-
tion to provisions requiring internet service providers to retain data); Juliana Gruenwald,
Europeans Defining the Long Arm of the Cyberlaw, ZDNet Inter@ctive Week Online (Sept
25, 2000), available online at <http://www.zdnet.com/intweek/stories/news/0,4164,
2631389,00.html> (visited Sept 25, 2000); Brian Krebs, E-Mail Campaign Targets Interna-
tional Cyber-Crime Treaty, Newsbytes (Nov 13, 2000), available online at <http://www.
newsbytes.com/news/00/158083.html> (visited Apr 3, 2001) (discussing privacy concerns
raised by a coalition of business, privacy, and human rights groups); Declan McCullagh,
Police Treaty a Global Invasion?, Wired News (Oct 17, 2000), available online at <http:ll
www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,39519,00.htm> (visited Oct 24, 2000) (noting that
thirty civil liberties groups from around the world say the treaty "improperly extends the
police authority of national governments" and endangers the privacy of internet users);
Cybercrime Treaty Draft: Take 23, Wired News (Nov 13, 2000), available online at
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means of dealing with the problem. The multilateral efforts,
while going far beyond ordinary mutual assistance mechanisms,
still generally leave in the hands of the state where the data is
physically stored the power to search or seize the data in ques-
tion.8" Countries have, however, claimed or sought even broader
powers. Some states claim a unilateral power to search and seize
data remotely, without assistance from the country in which the
data is stored; the United States recently acknowledged that it
exercised such a power in connection with an investigation of a
Russian hacking ring. 4 Some such assertions of power rest on the
view that data accessible from a computer within a territory is
"virtually present" there, and can be searched under the same
principles as if it were physically present.85 In other words, data
is simultaneously present for law enforcement purposes in all
jurisdictions from which a person-for example, the target of an
investigation-could lawfully access the data.s" Even if multilat-
<http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,40134,00.html> (visited Nov 20, 2001) (dis-
cussing opposition to treaty among civil liberties activists and anti-censorship groups);
Europe Slaving Over Cybercrime, Wired News (Mar 6, 2001), available online at
<http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,42228,00.html> (visited Apr 3, 2001) (discuss-
ing opposition voiced at a hearing held by Council of Europe). For specific privacy-oriented
comments on drafts of the treaty released between April and November 2000, see, for
example, Comments of the Center for Democracy and Technology on the Council of Europe
Draft "Convention on Cyber-crime" (Draft No 24) (Dec 11, 2000), available online at
<http://www.cdt.org/international/cybercrime/001211cdt.shtml> (visited Jan 29, 2001)
(recommending specific changes to the treaty to safeguard privacy and human rights);
Global Internet Liberty Campaign, Member Letter to Council of Europe Secretary General
Walter Schwimmer and COE Committee of Experts on Cyber Crime (Dec 12, 2000), avail-
able online at <http://www.gilc.org/privacy/coe-letter-1200.html> (visited Oct 25, 2001);
Letter from Bruce Heiman, Executive Director, Americans for Computer Privacy, to Mar-
tha Stansell-Gamm and Betty Shave, Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section,
U.S. Department of Justice, Re: Comments of Americans for Computer Privacy on Draft
No. 24 of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (Dec 7, 2000), available online
at <http://www.cdt.orglinternational/cybercrime/001207acp.shtml> (visited Jan 21, 2001);
[all internet materials cited in this note on file with U Chi Legal F].
83 See note 91 and accompanying text.
84 See note 23 and accompanying text.
85 An early statement of a British official reflects this view. See Sussmann, 9 Duke
Comp & Intl L at 472 (cited in note 11), quoting Paul Boateng, Minister of State for the
Home Office (UK), Tomorrow's Challenges for Law Enforcement, Keynote Address to the
Second International Conference for Criminal Intelligence Analysts (Mar 1, 1999) ("Juris-
diction over a database should not now depend only on where it happens to be physically
stored. Where the owners of the system have set it up to be accessible from another juris-
diction, it should be regarded as present in that jurisdiction for law enforcement pur-
poses.").
86 Such claims are somewhat analogous to the position taken by the United States
with respect to records held in foreign jurisdictions by banks with a branch in the United
States-that a U.S. court can compel production in the United States of the records held
in the foreign jurisdiction, notwithstanding the protections that the records receive under
the law of the foreign jurisdiction. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings Bank of Nova Scotia,
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eral arrangements such as the COE Convention prove useful in
some cases, it is all the more likely that states will engage in uni-
lateral cross-border searches; indeed, some view such searches as
an essential weapon in any successful strategy to combat certain
forms of computer crime.87
Other states that have not asserted a broad power to conduct
cross-border searches have advocated that such a power be recog-
nized in international instruments. In December of 1997, the Jus-
tice and Interior Ministers of the G-8 issued a communiqu6 advo-
cating the development of principles regarding cross-border
searches as well as searches of data whose location is unknown.8
Despite the Ministers' broad mandate, thus far there has been
little agreement on the circumstances in which states should be
permitted to engage in cross-border searches. Under the G-8
principles adopted in October 1999, a state can engage in cross-
border searches of "open-source" (publicly available) data and
data the searching state obtains the lawful consent to search. 9
The COE Convention contains similar provisions.9° Although the
actual cross-border search provisions are fairly limited, both the
G-8 and COE have committed to future examination of broader
provisions. In addition, states may pursue broader cross-border
search provisions in bilateral arrangements.
All three responses to the investigative difficulties that com-
puter crime cases create-proposals for multilateral regimes re-
quiring states to secure a quick freeze of data and to grant expe-
dited access to that data; unilateral assertions of a power to con-
duct remote cross-border searches; and attempts to gain recogni-
tion of cross-border search powers in international forums-raise
difficult questions of law and policy. For present purposes, I leave
to one side the policy questions raised by the G-8 and COE provi-
740 F2d 817, 826-29 (11th Cir 1984) (upholding a district court-imposed fine on a Cana-
dian-based bank where the bank had a pervasive U.S. presence and failed to produce
records held in a Cayman Islands branch subject to Cayman Islands' confidentiality laws).
87 See Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet and the Legitimacy of Remote Cross-Border
Searches, 2001 U Chi Legal F 103, 105-06 (describing the practical need for remote cross-
border searches to investigate cross-border cybercrimes).
88 See Action Plan to Combat High-Tech Crime, annex to Meeting of Justice and Inte-
rior Ministers of the Eight, Communiqud (Dec 10, 1997), available online at <http://www.
usdoj.gov/criminallcybercrime/action.htm> (visited Jan 27, 2001) [on file with U Chi Legal
F] (directing officials of member States to undertake certain policies and actions to pre-
vent abuses of information technologies).
89 Principles on Transborder Access to Stored Computer Data, in Ministerial Confer-
ence of the G-8 Countries on Combating Transnational Organized Crime Communiqud
annex 1, 6 (Moscow, Oct 19-20, 1999) [on file with U Chi Legal F].
90 Convention on Cyber-Crime at Art 32 (cited in note 26).
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sions calling for each country to adopt mechanisms for preserving
and disclosing data in response to a foreign request. As noted,
whatever the wisdom of such an arrangement, it leaves the state
in which the data is stored in control of the legal standards upon
which preservation or disclosure can occur.91 I discuss in Parts III
and IV the two responses that would create far greater privacy
threats: that states will unilaterally claim a power to engage in
remote cross-border searches or that states will seek recognition
of such a power in multilateral or bilateral arrangements.
III. UNILATERAL CROSS-BORDER SEARCHES
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
The main question that unilateral cross-border search claims
raise is whether remote cross-border searches conducted without
91 For this reason, two popular criticisms of the COE Convention-that it is inconsis-
tent with the Fourth Amendment and that it would require the United States to jettison
certain statutory privacy protections-are off the mark. As discussed below, no treaty can
obligate the United States to engage in actions inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment.
See text accompanying notes 147-51. To the extent that a multilateral arrangement would
obligate the United States to order the preservation of data, the United States could do so
only in circumstances meeting Fourth Amendment requirements. The Fourth Amendment
would likely permit preservation where there is probable cause to believe that data will be
lost if not preserved. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized, officials may law-
fully seize control of an item they have probable cause to believe contains contraband,
even if they must obtain a warrant before searching the item. See United States v
Jacobsen, 466 US 109, 114 (1984) (holding that government agents may lawfully seize a
package to prevent loss or destruction of suspected contraband without violating the
Fourth Amendment, but that a warrant is required to examine the contents after the
agents have control of the package); United States v Ross, 456 US 798, 809-12 (1982)
(reviewing cases holding that government agents must obtain a warrant to search closed
packages and containers after gaining control over them); Arkansas v Sanders, 442 US
753, 761-62 (1979) (recognizing that police acted properly in seizing luggage they sus-
pected to contain contraband when they had probable cause to believe that the luggage
would otherwise be driven away), overruled in part on other grounds, California v
Acevedo, 500 US 565 (1991); United States v Chadwick, 433 US 1, 13 & n 8 (1977) (holding
that a warrant was required to search a footlocker in exclusive control of federal agents
because there was no danger of the contents being removed or destroyed before a warrant
could be obtained), overruled in part on other grounds, California v Acevedo, 500 US 565
(1991). In California v Acevedo, the Supreme Court overruled portions of its prior opinions
holding that officials must obtain a warrant to search containers found within a moving
vehicle that officials have probable cause to search. That conclusion does not undermine-
and indeed reinforces-the rationale underlying the generally applicable rule that officials
may lawfully seize an item without a warrant to prevent its loss or destruction.
Under current U.S. law, the government can require that a service provider pre-
serve certain electronic communications by making a backup copy, even if the government
has not obtained a warrant to examine the contents of the communications. 18 USC
§ 2704(a) (1994) (permitting a governmental entity to include a backup requirement with
respect to communications it seeks under a subpoena or court order). The constitutionality
of this provision has not been tested.
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the consent of the searched state violate the customary interna-
tional law norm prohibiting law enforcement officials from per-
forming their functions in the territory of another state without
that state's consent. To resolve this issue, we must consider how
the rise of online activities affects the principles of international
law introduced in Part I A. The views of territorial sovereignty
underlying the opposing positions in the debate over the feasibil-
ity and legitimacy of state regulation of the internet provide a
useful starting point for addressing this question, even if they do
not fully resolve it. I ultimately conclude that remote cross-border
searches are not distinguishable in legally relevant ways from
physical searches. As a result, at least at present, unilateral
cross-border searches generally will violate customary interna-
tional law.
A. The Issue
The starting point for analyzing the legality of unilateral
cross-border searches is the principle, discussed in Part I A, that
one state generally has no power to conduct a law enforcement
investigation within the territory of another state without that
state's permission. This limitation reflects a well established rule
of customary international law.92 If foreign officials physically
entered the United States and conducted a search without U.S.
permission, they would violate customary international law, at
least in the absence of a colorable claim that they took these ac-
tions in response to a threat to the searching state's integrity or
security.93 The question is whether a principle generally barring a
state from conducting law enforcement activities in another
state's territory applies when the investigating officials never
physically enter the other state, but rather remotely search or
manipulate data found on servers within that state.
In examining the applicability of the rule of customary inter-
national law just described, it is important to address at the out-
set the means by which rules of customary international law de-
velop. In the standard account,9 a rule of customary interna-
92 See, for example, Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 432(2) (1987) ("A
state's law enforcement officers may exercise their functions in the territory of another
state only with the consent of the other state, given by duly authorized officials of that
state."). See also note 40.
93 See notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
94 I do not attempt to address the debate over whether this conception or any of sev-
eral others should prevail. For an outline of the perceived difficulties of this standard
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tional law arises from a practice of states consistently followed
out of a sense of legal obligation.9" It is possible to argue, based on
this understanding of what constitutes customary international
law, that by definition customary international law can impose no
limitations upon unilateral cross-border searches, because no
consistent state practice as to cross-border searches has yet de-
veloped. This view depends on two premises: first, that norms of
customary international law operate with a high degree of speci-
ficity, such that a particular rule of customary international law
does not constrain a state when there are variations in the fac-
tual circumstances surrounding the state's potential action; and
second, that a remote cross-border search is sufficiently different
from other investigative activities barred by the customary inter-
national law rule so as to render the rule inapposite.
The first premise is not self-evidently correct. States can al-
most always point to different factual circumstances justifying
departure from a custom; if variations in factual circumstances
always exempt states from rules of customary interrational law,
such rules would rarely constrain state conduct. Moreover, in the
specific context of the customary international law rule against
conducting investigations in the territory of another sovereign,
factual variations have not prevented states from objecting to
perceived violations of the broad principle.96 But even if the first
formulation, see, for example, Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Custom-
ary International Law, 66 U Chi L Rev 1113, 1117-18 (1999).
95 See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 102(2) (1987) ("Customary
international law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them
from a sense of legal obligation."); Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law at 4-7
(cited in note 34) (describing practice and obligation components of customary interna-
tional law); J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations; An Introduction to the International Law of
Peace 59-62 (Clarendon 6th ed 1963) (same); Paust, et al, International Criminal Law:
Cases and Materials at 4-5 (cited in note 46) (same).
96 For example, states have objected to efforts by the United States to compel foreign
banks with branches in the United States to produce certain records in the United States.
See In re Grand Jury Proceedings Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F2d 817, 826-29 (11th Cir
1984); Tamar Levin, Business and the Law: United States vs. Bank of Nova Scotia, NY
Times D2 (Dec 13, 1983) (quoting Canadian criticisms of purportedly extraterritorial en-
forcement of U.S. subpoenas); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Litigation and the
Quest for Reasonableness: Essays in Private International Law 173 (Clarendon 1996) (not-
ing that Canada and the United Kingdom oppose the enforcement of foreign subpoenas).
More recently, one commentator has suggested that states have come to accept
such actions. See Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law at 310-12 (cited in note
34) (stating that U.S. courts "have taken the view that whenever activity abroad has con-
sequences or effects within the United States which are contrary to local legislation then
the American courts may make orders requiring... the production of documents"; noting
foreign opposition to such actions but stating that the present position is probably that "a
state has enforcement jurisdiction abroad only to the extent necessary to enforce its legis-
lative jurisdiction," and that this position rests upon principles permitting the exercise of
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premise is correct, we must determine whether remote cross-
border searches are qualitatively different from the sort of physi-
cal investigative activities the rule clearly covers. In other words,
we must evaluate the second premise-that remote cross-border
searches are distinguishable from physical searches in legally
relevant ways.
The customary international law rule that one state cannot
conduct investigative activities in the territory of another state
reflects the basic principle that a state is "sovereign" within its
own territory.97 It is generally not necessary to define precisely
what gives rise to the affront to sovereignty in this context, be-
cause two objectionable actions go hand in hand: the physical en-
try of a foreign state's officials and the subsequent search or sei-
zure of persons or property. In the case of a remote cross-border
search, however, the search or seizure forms the sole basis for
any sovereignty-based objection to the foreign state's conduct.
The question, then, is whether the absence of a physical entry
eliminates the searched state's sovereignty-based objection to the
foreign state's action.
We can view this question as one in a larger set of issues con-
cerning how the law should adapt to the increasingly widespread
use of computer systems cutting across borders. Thus far, the
scholarly debate over these questions has focused on whether
states can and should prescribe laws governing online activities-
that is, on whether the first international law principle discussed
in Part I A, permitting states to regulate extraterritorial conduct
with harmful effects within its borders, applies in the internet
context. The views of territorial sovereignty that seem to underlie
the opposing poles in this debate, however, can shed some light
on how the second principle, prohibiting states from conducting
investigations in the territory of another state, applies in the
internet context. In the next section, I introduce the poles in the
regulation debate and the views of territorial sovereignty under-
lying those poles. I then draw upon those views to evaluate
whether the customary international law prohibition on extrater-
jurisdiction over "corporations with complex structures and foreign-based subsidiaries").
Even this view does not necessarily support the first premise discussed in the text. At
most, it suggests that the customary international law rule eventually evolved to allow
actions such as those taken by the United States, not that the U.S. actions were at the
time consistent with customary international law on the theory that the prevailing norm
did not apply in the particular factual circumstances.
97 See Jennings and Watts, eds, I Oppenheim's International Law at 382 (cited in note
27) (discussing components of sovereignty, including "the power of a state to exercise su-
preme authority over all persons and things within its territory").
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ritorial enforcement activities should apply when the investigat-
ing state's officials never enter the target state's territory, but
rather remotely search data stored there.
B. The Regulation Debate
In their provocative article Law and Borders-The Rise of
Law in Cyberspace, David Johnson and David Post argue that
states generally should not attempt to apply geographically based
regulations to internet transactions. 8 They first claim that such
regulations will be ineffective."9 Legal institutions, they argue,
generally correspond to a particular physical space and exercise
control only over conduct that occurs within that space."° This
fact ordinarily does not interfere with a state's ability to protect
persons or property within its borders, because harmful effects
tend to occur in close proximity to the conduct that produces
them.' Because the global computer network allows communica-
tions to travel great distances at low cost and with no degrada-
tion, Johnson and Post argue, activities to which a state may
wish to attach legal consequences can occur as easily outside of a
state's borders as within those borders." 2 Recent examples
abound. Until December 2000, the web portal Yahoo! permitted
users of its auction site to offer Nazi memorabilia for sale. Anti-
discrimination groups in France objected to the accessibility of
the materials to French internet users, even though Yahoo!'s
server operates in California. 3 Similarly, German officials re-
98 Johnson and Post, 48 Stan L Rev at 1368-78 (cited in note 28).
99 Id at 1372 ("[E]fforts" to control the flow of electronic information across physical
borders-to map local regulation and physical boundaries onto Cyberspace-are likely to
prove futile, at least in countries that hope to participate in global commerce.").
100 Id at 1368 ("Territorial borders, generally speaking, delineate areas within which
different sets of rules apply. There has until now been a general correspondence between
borders drawn in physical space.., and borders in 'law space.'").
101 Id at 1369 (arguing that the correspondence between physical boundaries and "law
space" boundaries reflects the fact that harmful effects usually occur in close proximity to
the behavior producing them).
102 Johnson and Post, 48 Stan L Rev at 1375 (cited in note 28) (arguing that "the ef-
fects of online activities" are not "tied to geographically proximate locations").
103 Two groups, the League Against Racism and Antisemitism ("LICRA") and the
French Union of Jewish Students ("UEJF"), sued Yahoo! in French court. Jason Straziuso,
French Anti-Racist Group Sues Yahoo, AP Online, 2000 WL 19049132 (Apr 11, 2000) (re-
porting LICRA's suit); Complaint in Yahoo! Inc v La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et
L'Antisemitisme, No C00-21275, $$ 8, 17-18 (N D Cal Dec 21, 2000) [on file with U Chi
Legal F] (noting the location of Yahoo!'s servers in Santa Clara, California, and providing
a chronology of complaints filed by LICRA and UEJF). The groups claimed that Yahoo!
violated a provision of the French penal code providing:
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cently sought to prosecute the operator of a site questioning
whether the Holocaust occurred for violating Germany's laws
against inciting racism or anti-Semitism, even though the site
was based in Australia. 104 In Johnson and Post's view, the fact
that the harm a state seeks to prevent can come from anywhere
in the world undermines the efficacy of the state's regulation: a
state can only enforce its law by exercising physical control over,
and imposing sanctions upon, those who violate it. °5
Johnson and Post also claim that state attempts to regulate
online phenomena will largely be illegitimate. First, any attempt
to impose a law upon persons situated outside the state's borders
is inconsistent with the notion that "those subject to a set of laws
must have a role in their formulation."'' ° In addition, a physical
border provides persons crossing it with notice that they may be
subject to different legal rules.' 7 Johnson and Post argue that if a
state attempts to impose its laws upon online transactions cut-
ting across borders, the state will be subjecting to its legal regime
persons who neither consented to the regime nor had notice of its
applicability.0 8 Moreover, other states in a similar position will
It shall be punished by the fine provided for violations of the fifth class,
except for the needs of a film, show, or exhibit including an historical
evocation, to wear or to display in public a uniform, insignia, or emblem
evoking the uniforms, insignia, or emblems worn or displayed either by
the members of an organization declared to be criminal pursuant to Arti-
cle 9 of the statute of the international military tribunal annexed to the
London agreement of August 8, 1945, or by a person found guilty by a
French or international court of one or several crimes against humanity
provided by Articles 211-1 to 212-3 or provided in law number 64-1326 of
December 26, 1964.
Code Penal Art R 645-1 (France) (translation by author).
In November 2000, a French court ordered Yahoo! to block French users from ac-
cessing the material. See Mylene Mangalindan and Kevin Delaney, Yahoo! Ordered to Bar
the French from Nazi Items, Wall St J B1 (Nov 21, 2000). For an English translation of the
French court's November 2000 decision, see <http://www.cdt.org/speech/internationall
001120yahoofrance.pdf> (visited Dec 13, 2001) [on file with U Chi Legal F]. For a discus-
sion of the case, see Joel Reidenberg, The Yahoo! Case and International Democratization
of the Internet, Fordham University School of Law Research Paper No 11 (2001), available
online at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=267148> (visited Nov 7,
2001) [on file with U Chi Legal F].
104 See Peter Finn, Neo-Nazis Sheltering Web Sites In the U.S.; German Courts Begin
International Pursuit, Wash Post Al (Dec 21, 2000).
105 Johnson and Post, 48 Stan L Rev at 1369 (cited in note 28).
106 Id at 1370.
107 Id.
1o Id (arguing that the rise of the global computer network destroys the link between
geographical location and "the legitimacy of a local sovereign's efforts to regulate global
phenomena; and ... the ability of physical location to give notice of which sets of rules
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have equal claim to regulate the conduct in question, thereby
subjecting online actors to an array of potentially inconsistent
legal regimes." 9
As discussed in Part I A, international law generally permits
states to regulate extraterritorial conduct causing harmful effects
within a state's borders. Although Johnson and Post do not dis-
cuss this principle, their analysis implicitly rejects its application
in the internet context. If we assume that it is generally legiti-
mate for a state to prescribe laws governing conduct with harmful
local effects,10 Johnson and Post's arguments provide a useful
basis for exploring why application of the effects principle might
nevertheless be problematic in the internet context. First, the
internet dramatically expands the number of transactions that
cut across international borders, 1 ' and a state therefore cannot
control data flows into and out of its territory."1 Second, a state
has a limited ability to enforce its regulations against those who
use the global computer network to cause harm within its terri-
apply"); id at 1375 ("Territorial regulation of online activities serves neither the legitimacy
nor the notice justifications.").
109 Johnson and Post, 48 Stan L Rev at 1374 (cited in note 28) ("[A]ssertions of law-
making authority over Net activities on the ground that those activities constitute 'entry
into' the physical jurisdiction can just as easily be made by any territorially-based author-
ity."); id at 1376 ("[N]o physical jurisdiction has a more compelling claim than any other to
subject these events exclusively to its laws.").
110 It is possible that Johnson and Post or other commentators who argue that states
should not apply geographically based regulations to internet transactions would reject
this principle even outside of the internet context. I do not intend to ascribe one view or
the other to Johnson and Post. In light of the widespread acceptance of the effects princi-
ple, it is useful to ask whether Johnson and Post's arguments call into question the appli-
cation of the principle in the internet context, even if Johnson and Post or other commen-
tators would question its application more broadly.
111 Johnson and Post, 48 Stan L Rev at 1372 (cited in note 28) (noting that "[tihe vol-
ume of electronic communications crossing territorial boundaries is just too great in rela-
tion to the resources available to government authorities").
112 Id ("[Elfforts to control the flow of electronic information across borders ... are
likely to prove futile, at least in countries that hope to participate in global commerce.").
Of course, a state could control, through ownership or regulation, the internet service
providers operating in its territory so as to limit the information its citizens can access.
See Timothy S. Wu, Note, Cyberspace Sovereignty?-The Internet and the International
System, 10 Harv J L & Tech 647, 651 (1997) ("By exercising control over the physical com-
ponents required for Internet access, the state can regulate cyberspace. At the most basic
level, a state can simply choose not to have any connection to the Internet.'). Different
states have pursued this approach. For a catalog of states that control or regulate internet
service providers or attempt to screen out internet content, see Enemies of the Internet,
Excerpt & Table of Contents (Reporters without Borders & Transfert.net Feb 28, 2001),
available online at <http://www.OOhOO.com/direct.cfin?titre=4802011802> (visited Dec 13,
2001) [on file with U Chi Legal F].
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tory,"3 particularly since participants in such transactions are as
likely to be individual consumers as companies with foreign as-
sets and presence."' These arguments support the view that the
internet narrows the conception of territorial sovereignty that
ordinarily would support a state's regulation of extraterritorial
conduct. In other words, even if regulation of extraterritorial con-
duct with harmful local effects is generally permissible, the fact
that states are less able to control data flows and enforce regula-
tions in the internet context makes state regulation of harmful
effects in the internet context less legitimate.
Jack Goldsmith challenges Johnson and Post's conclusions on
a number of points,"5 and his conclusions rest on a broader view
of territorial sovereignty. Goldsmith accepts both the principle of
international law permitting a state to regulate extraterritorial
conduct with harmful effects in its territory, and the application
of this principle in the internet context. He argues that online
activities cutting across international borders are, from jurisdic-
tional and choice-of-law perspectives, similar to other transna-
tional transactions that states have successfully regulated for
many years."6 Although a state generally can enforce its laws
only against persons present or holding assets within its terri-
tory," ' or persons the state can successfully bring within its ju-
risdiction through extradition or other means,"8 the state has a
11 Johnson and Post, 48 Stan L Rev at 1371-74 (cited in note 28) (describing how the
internet undermines states' power to control online activities).
114 Id at 1370-71 (noting how the internet allows communications to be transmitted
great distances at low cost, "without any physical cues or barriers that might otherwise
keep certain geographically remote places and people separate from one another"). See
also Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace 193 (Basic Books 1999) (argu-
ing that the difficulties in resolving the question of how states should regulate the inter-
net arise in part from the fact that existing tools for resolving conflict of law questions
were designed to deal with conflicts among "institutions, or relatively sophisticated ac-
tors," not ordinary citizens).
11 The most detailed critique appears in Goldsmith, 65 U Chi L Rev 1199 (cited in
note 30). See also sources cited in note 30.
116 Goldsmith, 65 U Chi L Rev at 1211-12 (cited in note 30).
117 Id at 1216.
118 Id. Extradition treaties generally contain a requirement of "dual criminality"-that
the offense for which extradition is sought be criminal both in the requesting and re-
quested jurisdictions. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Extradition: United States
Law and Practice 384, 388-93 (Oceana 1996); Michael Abbell and Bruno A. Ristau, 4
International Judicial Assistance § 13-2-4 at 66-71 (Intl Law Institute 1990 & Supp 1997).
This requirement has already proven to be an obstacle in computer crime cases. For ex-
ample, the Philippines could neither prosecute nor extradite the individual accused of
releasing the "I Love You" virus, because the Philippines had no law banning computer
crime at the time of the incident. See Glanz, "Love Bug" Creator Could Go Scot-Free, Wash
Times at B10 (cited in note 10).
CHASING BITS ACROSS BORDERS
number of other regulatory alternatives. For example, a state can
target local end-users who participate in a disfavored transac-
tion119 or impose obligations on parties that facilitate the transac-
tion, such as internet service providers or financial institutions
with a local presence.12° Accordingly, Goldsmith concludes, state
regulation of internet transactions will be more successful than
Johnson and Post believe.
Goldsmith also challenges the view that regulation of such
transactions is illegitimate. He argues that a conception of terri-
torial sovereignty that does not account for a state's power to
regulate activities having harmful local effects is unduly nar-
row.21 In addition, even if territorially based regulation will sub-
ject online actors to multiple legal obligations, that fact alone
does not make such regulation illegitimate 22-particularly in
light of the limitations on a state's power to enforce its regula-
tions. 23 Finally, if one who provides content over the internet can
reasonably foresee that the content will then be available across
international boundaries and subject to other states' laws, Gold-
smith argues, then Johnson and Post's concern about the lack of
notice of legal obligations in cyberspace has less force.'24
As this discussion illustrates, the competing perspectives on
the feasibility and legitimacy of internet regulation support dif-
ferent conceptions of territorial sovereignty. If we accept the
proposition that states generally have the power to regulate ex-
traterritorial conduct with harmful local effects, the view that
states should not regulate internet transactions implicitly rests
on the theory that the internet narrows the conception of territo-
rial sovereignty that ordinarily legitimizes extraterritorial regu-
lation. The view that regulation of internet transactions is no less
119 See Goldsmith, 65 U Chi L Rev at 1222 & n 98 (cited in note 30).
120 Id at 1222.
121 Id at 1240 ("Under current conceptions of territorial sovereignty, a jurisdiction is
allowed to regulate extraterritorial acts that cause harmful local effects unless and until it
has consented to a higher law (for example, international law or constitutional law) that
specifies otherwise."). See id at 1205 ("The [regulation] skeptics are in the grip of a nine-
teenth century territorialist conception of how 'real space' is regulated and how 'real-
space' conflicts of law are resolved.").
122 Id at 1240 ("[Tlhere is nothing extraordinary or illegitimate about unilateral regu-
lation of transnational activity that affects activity and regulation in other countries.").
123 Goldsmith, 65 U Chi L Rev at 1220 (cited in note 30).
124 Id at 1244 (arguing that, with respect to notice of the application of local law to
extraterritorial conduct, the U.S. Constitution and international law at most require that
the defendant be able to reasonably foresee the application of the law; "the standard of
foreseeability depends on a complex mixture of what the content provider knows or rea-
sonably should have known about the geographical consequences of its acts, the signifi-
cance of the extrajurisdictional harms caused by the acts, and the costs of precautions").
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feasible or legitimate than regulation of other transactions, in
contrast, rests on the theory that the modern conception of terri-
torial sovereignty is broad enough to permit states to regulate
extraterritorial activities with harmful effects within their bor-
ders, and nothing about the internet undermines this approach.
C. Territorial Sovereignty and Jurisdiction to Enforce
Having identified different views of territorial sovereignty
underlying the competing perspectives on the feasibility and le-
gitimacy of internet regulation, it is useful to ask what light, if
any, these views shed on the permissible scope of enforcement
activities in the internet context. The contours of states' power to
conduct enforcement activities affecting persons and property in
other states have largely gone unexplored.
In examining states' authority to prescribe rules governing
extraterritorial conduct, Johnson and Post and Goldsmith ac-
knowledge the gap between a state's power to regulate extraterri-
torial conduct and its power to enforce those regulations.'25 For
Johnson and Post, the gap between a state's regulatory power
and its enforcement power supports an argument that states
should not seek to apply territorially based regulations to online
activities, because the state's inability to enforce its regulations
against law-violators not located within its territory renders any
attempt to regulate both futile and illegitimate.126 In contrast,
Goldsmith believes that this gap reinforces, rather than under-
mines, the legitimacy of territorially based regulation. The fact
that a state can principally enforce a regulation only against per-
sons with presence or assets within its jurisdiction is an impor-
tant check against inconsistent or overzealous regulation of
online transactions by multiple sovereigns.'27
Although limitations on states' jurisdiction to enforce thus
figure prominently in the regulation debate, scholars have largely
confined their discussion of enforcement authority to the power of
courts to exercise jurisdiction and thereby to subject persons or
property to a final, binding judgment, whether civil or criminal.
125 See text accompanying notes 105, 117-18.
126 Johnson and Post, 48 Stan L Rev at 1369 (cited in note 28) ("Law-making requires
some mechanism for law enforcement, which in turn depends on the ability to exercise
physical control over, and impose coercive sanctions on, law-violators.").
127 Goldsmith, 65 U Chi L Rev at 1220 (cited in note 30) ("[Tjhe [regulation] skeptics
exaggerate the threat of multiple regulation of cyberspace information flows. This threat
must be measured by a regulation's enforceable scope, not by its putative scope. And the
enforceable scope is relatively narrow.").
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As a result, scholars seem to assume that the limitations are
relatively static. Whether the limitations are static in the inter-
net context, however, is precisely the question we must address.
As more and more evidence is stored in electronic form, does the
line between a state's jurisdiction to regulate extraterritorial
conduct-permissible if extraterritorial conduct causes harm in
the state's territory-and a state's jurisdiction to investigate ac-
tivities in the territory of another sovereign-impermissible even
in the face of harmful effects within its territory-begin to blur? I
use the views of territorial sovereignty underlying the competing
perspectives on the feasibility and legitimacy of internet regula-
tion as a starting point for answering this question.
As noted above, the position that states cannot and should
not regulate internet transactions-despite the fact that states
regulate other transnational transactions-seems to rest upon
the premise that the rise of online activities narrows state
power.12 This narrower view of state power presumably would
not support a state's claim to a right to engage in a remote cross-
border search: if a state cannot legitimately regulate online ac-
tivities occurring outside its borders, there is no basis for it to
conduct investigative or other enforcement activities. The prob-
lem, however, is that states can invoke a remote cross-border
search power not only in investigations of extraterritorial con-
duct, but also in connection with an otherwise domestic investiga-
tion involving evidence fortuitously or deliberately stored
abroad.'29
Moreover, the existing customary international law limita-
tion on one state conducting investigative activities in the terri-
tory of another sovereign is itself premised on robust principles of
territorial sovereignty. If the position that states cannot and
should not regulate internet transactions rests on the premise
that the internet narrows state sovereignty, then this narrower
conception of state sovereignty tends to undermine the limitation.
For example, to the extent that a state's objection to cross-border
investigative activities would rest on the state's power to control
the flow of electrons into its borders, Johnson and Post's argu-
ments with respect to state regulation essentially concede that
states lack this power."3 ° And to the extent that a state could ob-
128 See text accompanying notes 110-14.
129 See text accompanying notes 70-71.
130 See Johnson and Post, 48 Stan L Rev at 1372 (cited in note 28) (noting limitations
on states' power to control flow of electronic information).
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ject to a cross-border search on the ground that the activities of
foreign officials violate its laws-such as prohibitions on hacking
or protections on privacy-Johnson and Post's regulation argu-
ments would suggest that these protections cannot legitimately
apply to extraterritorial conduct. After all, laws protecting pri-
vacy or prohibiting hacking are not, in jurisdictional terms, dis-
tinguishable from state laws governing the accessibility of harm-
ful content over the internet; all of these forms of regulation are
designed to prevent extraterritorial conduct with harmful effects
in the target state.'
As this discussion suggests, the narrow conception of territo-
rial sovereignty underlying the view that states cannot regulate
internet transactions would arguably suggest that all geographi-
cally based protections of data are illegitimate-and that princi-
ples of territorial sovereignty therefore do not constrain cross-
border searches. Returning to Johnson and Post's arguments,
however, it is possible to arrive at a different conclusion.'32 Al-
though Johnson and Post speak in very broad terms about the
ineffectiveness and illegitimacy of territorially based regulation of
internet transactions, they seem primarily concerned with state
regulation of internet content that is merely accessible from
within a state's territory, and not with regulation of activities
specifically targeted at a state's territory and intended to cause
harm there. The distinction between the two types of regulation
is important. The perceived injustice in regulating internet con-
tent is that an individual providing content may be unable to
make that content publicly available where the content is lawful,
with certainty that it will not be accessed where it is unlawful.'33
131 For a similar argument, see Goldsmith, 65 U Chi L Rev at 1244 (cited in note 30)
(arguing that, in terms of fairness, there is no distinction between subjecting a content
provider to the laws of a foreign jurisdiction and subjecting one who releases a virus that
destroys computers connected to the internet to the laws of a foreign jurisdiction).
132 Again, while Johnson and Post's assumptions and arguments provide a useful tool
for exploring conceptions of territorial sovereignty, I do not intend to attribute to Johnson
and Post any conclusions about states' power to conduct remote cross-border searches.
Because Johnson and Post argue that states should not regulate the internet, they might
well conclude that any state enforcement activities associated with such regulation are
also illegitimate. Even so, the arguments underlying their conclusions are useful in
exploring a more moderate view-that, even conceding that a state can regulate some
transnational transactions, regulation of internet transactions cutting across inter-
national borders is illegitimate.
133 Johnson and Post, 48 Stan L Rev at 1373-74 n 20 (cited in note 28) ("It is our con-
tention that posting offensive materials in areas where unwilling readers may come across
them inadvertently raises problems that are best addressed by those who understand the
technology involved, rather than by extrapolating from the conflicting laws of multiple
geographic jurisdictions.").
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In other words, even a provider who intends that users view his
or her content only where it is lawful to do so may fear liability in
a state where it is unlawful.3
This concern does not, of course, support the conclusion that
all territorially based regulation of internet activities is illegiti-
mate. Rather, it supports the narrower conclusion that states
should not seek to regulate a content provider when the provider
makes content available in such a manner that only the affirma-
tive, intentional conduct of a local end-user triggers the harm the
state seeks to avoid. This narrower conclusion leads to a different
view of whether states can conduct remote cross-borders
searches. Such searches are not analogous to the mere provision
of content without intent that the content be accessed where it is
unlawful, but rather to activities directed at and intended to
cause harm in another territory. Here, the harm in question is an
134 See note 34 and accompanying text. The distinction drawn in the text between
activities directed at a particular state and intended to cause harm there and activities
that cause harm only by virtue of the intervening acts of a local user is somewhat analo-
gous to the distinction U.S. courts draw between different types of websites when deter-
mining whether a court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant comports with
due process. Due process requires that a defendant have "minimum contacts" with the
forum such that the exercise of jurisdiction would not offend notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice. International Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310, 316 (1945). If a defen-
dant lacks the continuous and systematic contacts that would support an exercise of gen-
eral jurisdiction, a court will determine whether to exercise specific jurisdiction by inquir-
ing whether the defendant has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum, see Burger King Corp v Rudzewicz, 471 US 462, 475 (1985),
and whether an exercise of jurisdiction would be reasonable, see World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp v Woodson, 444 US 286, 297 (1980). In applying these principles to internet cases,
courts generally have declined to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant who operates a
"passive" site-that is, one that merely makes information available to persons in another
jurisdiction. See, for example, Cybersell, Inc v Cybersell, Inc, 130 F3d 414, 419-20 (9th Cir
1997) (holding that an Arizona court lacked personal jurisdiction over operators of a Flor-
ida-based website because the site was merely informational and was geared for local
activity); Bensusan Restaurant Corp v King, 937 F Supp 295, 301 (S D NY 1996) (conclud-
ing that a defendant who operated a website providing general information about a local
jazz club did not purposely avail himself of the laws of another state in which the site
could be accessed). Courts have, however, exercised personal jurisdiction over defendants
who operate "interactive" sites designed to permit users to exchange information with the
site. See Maritz, Inc v Cybergold, Inc, 947 F Supp 1328, 1332-33 (E D Mo 1996) (holding
that jurisdiction was proper where a website encouraged users to add addresses to an
automated mailing list to receive updates about upcoming service). In addition, courts
have exercised jurisdiction over defendants who "do business" over the internet, thus
specifically directing activities at particular forums. See CompuServe v Patterson, 89 F3d
1257, 1264-65 (6th Cir 1996) (holding that defendant who used CompuServe's website to
market and sell his software in Ohio purposefully directed activities toward Ohio); Zippo
Manufacturing Co v Zippo Dot Com, Inc, 952 F Supp 1119, 1125-26 (W D Pa 1997) (find-
ing personal jurisdiction where defendant contracted with seven internet providers within
the forum state to provide services for more than three thousand customers residing in
that state).
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intentional interference with the searched state's power to pro-
vide privacy or property protections within its territory. Viewed
this way, the effect of the remote search or seizure is functionally
equivalent to the sort of actions at issue in the Alvarez-Machain
case, where the United States intentionally interfered with Mex-
ico's power to protect its nationals.135 Thus, even if the internet
narrows a state's territorial sovereignty, by rendering regulations
of certain conduct-specifically, conduct not directed toward caus-
ing harm in a particular territory-illegitimate, the resulting
principle cuts against, not in favor of, state claims to a unilateral
remote cross-border search power.
As this discussion suggests, the view that geographically
based regulation of internet transactions is illegitimate does not
call into question the customary international law principle pro-
hibiting a state's law enforcement officials from performing ac-
tivities in the territory of another sovereign, or its application to
remote cross-border searches. Indeed, evaluating state claims
regarding cross-border searches helps bring into focus the con-
cerns underlying the view that states should not regulate inter-
net transactions. The perceived legitimacy problems arise not
when a user specifically directs its activities to a particular coun-
try seeking to cause harm there, but rather when a content pro-
vider merely makes material available and the local harm follows
from the affirmative conduct of a local user.
I now turn to the other pole in the regulation debate. Gold-
smith argues that the modern conception of territorial sover-
eignty permits a state to regulate activities having harmful ef-
fects wherever the activities occur.136 At first glance, this ap-
proach would seem to suggest that concepts of territorial sover-
eignty likewise empower a state to protect property or persons
within its territory against the actions of a foreign state, even
when foreign officials never set foot in the target state's territory.
Focusing on the effects principle on which Goldsmith's view
about regulation relies, however, reveals that the matter is not so
simple. Just as the target state would likely argue that it can le-
gitimately prevent or respond to a foreign state's remote search
because of the harm the search would cause within its borders,
the searching state would likely argue that its actions are simply
135 See text accompanying notes 41-42.
136 Goldsmith, 65 U Chi L Rev at 1208 (cited in note 30) (noting that customary inter-
national law permits a state "to apply its law to extraterritorial behavior with substantial
local effects").
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a response to conduct occurring in the target state but causing
harm within its borders. In other words, the view that states
have the power to conduct remote cross-border searches presents
a conflict between two claimed sovereignty interests: the interest
of the target state in regulating harm caused by the extraterrito-
rial conduct of the searching state's officials; and the interest of
the searching state in regulating the harm giving rise to the
search.
The view of territorial sovereignty underlying Goldsmith's
position thus highlights, but does not resolve, a stark conflict be-
tween competing sovereignty claims. How do we resolve this con-
flict? Do the competing sovereignty claims at issue in cross-border
search situations render the general customary international law
rule against performing law enforcement activities in the terri-
tory of another state inapplicable? We can approach these ques-
tions by noting that this same conflict exists when foreign offi-
cials physically enter another state to conduct investigative ac-
tivities. The searching state may believe that international law
permits it to regulate certain activities, and the power to enforce
its regulations is a necessary incident to this power even when
doing so would interfere with another state's sovereignty. This
approach, of course, is not consistent with the distinction typi-
cally drawn between a state's jurisdiction to regulate and a
state's jurisdiction to enforce; while a state can regulate extrater-
ritorial conduct, it generally cannot take enforcement actions ex-
traterritorially.'37 The argument that cross-border searches are
outside of the customary international law rule barring extrater-
ritorial law enforcement activities, then, must rest on the conclu-
sion that the line between jurisdiction to regulate and jurisdiction
to enforce collapses in the internet context. Accordingly, we must
examine the basis for this line and ask if features of the internet
alter it.
The gap between states' power to regulate and states' power
to enforce such regulation is actually of relatively recent vintage.
As previously noted, until the mid-twentieth century, states'
regulatory powers were thought to extend only to their borders.'38
Indeed, other states protested U.S. attempts to apply its regula-
tions to extraterritorial activities.139 When a state regulates ex-
traterritorial activities, its actions interfere to some extent with
137 See Part I A.
138 See text accompanying notes 35-36.
139 See note 38 and accompanying text.
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the foreign state's sovereignty, in the sense that the regulating
state's action might disrupt certain policy goals in the state
where the regulation's effects are felt. For example, within the
United States, the First Amendment permits only limited gov-
ernment regulation of speech; the policy goals underlying this
provision are to some extent frustrated when France seeks to en-
force a ban on the display of certain objectionable materials
against a company that operates servers in the United States and
caters principally to a U.S. audience.14 ° Similarly, the application
of a U.S. rule that would prohibit British reinsurers from refus-
ing, in concert, to sell certain types of insurance in the United
States indirectly affects a British rule permitting such actions, in
that those companies seeking to comply with the U.S. rule will
take actions that British law would not require."'
These interferences, however, are largely indirect. Nothing
prevents a state from adopting its own regulatory scheme and
applying it where its sovereignty permits. An extraterritorial
regulation may frustrate certain policy goals by forcing private
parties within one state's territory to adjust their activities to
conform to a foreign state's law. But the primary purpose of such
regulation is likely to be the advancement of certain regulatory
goals within the regulating state; frustration of the foreign state's
policy goals is merely a byproduct of the regulating state's action.
The interference with the sovereignty of the state in which the
regulated conduct occurs is relatively minor, in the sense that the
regulating state's actions are not specifically directed toward in-
terfering with the other state's sovereign interests.
When a foreign state's officials enter a state's territory to per-
form investigative functions, the interference with sovereignty is
in no sense indirect: the investigating state specifically intends to
interfere with the target state's ability to exert exclusive control
over persons and property within its borders. This distinction be-
tween direct and indirect interferences with a state's sovereign
interests parallels the distinction previously noted between pri-
vate activities specifically directed at a particular state and in-
tended to cause harm there and private activities that cause
harm indirectly by virtue of the intervening acts of a local user.42
Activities specifically directed at a particular state implicate a
140 See note 103 and accompanying text.
141 See Hartford Fire Insurance Co v California, 509 US 674 (1993) (applying the
Sherman Antitrust Act to actions of British reinsurers).
142 See text accompanying notes 132-34.
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state's sovereignty interests even under a narrow conception of
territorial sovereignty. If we distinguish between a state's power
to regulate and its power to conduct investigative activities based
on the impact that each power has on the affected state's sover-
eign interests, then the question with respect to remote cross-
border searches is whether the fact that searching officials never
enter the target state's territory renders this distinction inappli-
cable. In other words, does the fact that the searching officials
never enter the target state's territory convert the affront to sov-
ereignty from an intentional performance of sovereign functions
on another state's territory into mere interference with the goals
of a regulatory scheme-here, a regulatory scheme designed to
protect persons or property within its territory?
There are three potential bases for arguing that a remote
cross-border search, like mere regulation, presents only an indi-
rect affront to another state's sovereignty and that states should
therefore have more freedom to conduct remote cross-border
searches than they do to enter the target state and conduct
physical searches. First, it could be argued that a remote search
is less invasive than a physical search. It is not clear, however,
why this is so."" If the sovereignty interest at issue is the target
state's power to protect persons and property within its borders,
it does not matter whether interference with that power comes
from inside or outside of the target state. If this interference were
irrelevant to the sovereignty analysis, then a foreign state could,
without objection, rely upon persons already legitimately within
the target state's territory to conduct its investigative activities.
And in the case of a remote cross-border search in which the
143 As U.S. courts have suggested, the sort of unauthorized access to a computer sys-
tem involved in a cross-border search is analogous to a trespass to chattels. See note 161.
This interference with property interests-as well as personal privacy interests-
distinguishes a remote cross-border search from other activities, such as the use of satel-
lites for remote sensing related to management of natural resources and environmental
protection, that are not thought to violate international law. See Principles Relating to the
Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space, UN General Assembly Res 41165, 42 UN
GAOR Annex at 2 (95th Plenary Meeting), UN Doc AIRES/41/65 (1987) (adopting princi-
ples relating to remote sensing of the Earth from space); United Nations: Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Draft Principles on Remote Sensing, 25 ILM 1331, 1331
(1986) (explaining that the principles do not adopt the proposition that "national sover-
eignty required the consent of a sensed State prior to foreign sensing"); Hamilton DeSaus-
sure, Remote Sensing Satellite Regulation by National and International Law, 15 Rutgers
Comp & Tech L J 351, 353-58 (1989) (explaining the debate over whether remote sensing
violates international law). Analogously, the notion that a foreign country's manipulation
of data is akin to a trespass and to interference with protected privacy interests distin-
guishes a cross-border search from activities such as using powerful equipment to view
events occurring across a border but otherwise in plain view.
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searching state knows where the data is located, this interference
is not merely a byproduct of a policy intended to operate both
within and without its borders, but an intentional harm directed
at the target state's territory.
Second, in some circumstances it will not be possible for a
searching state to know where the data it seeks is located. Even if
this observation is correct, it does not lead to the broad conclusion
that states are free to engage in cross-border searches in all cir-
cumstances; at most, it suggests that an accidental search of data
in a foreign state does not have the sort of direct, intended effect
on state sovereignty that justifies the distinction between juris-
diction to regulate and jurisdiction to enforce, not that all cross-
border searches fail to produce such effects.
Third, the architecture of the internet is such that the loca-
tion of data may be fortuitous. The target state's interest in pro-
tecting persons and property within its borders is therefore likely
to be attenuated in some circumstances. A searching state may
have a stronger interest in the data than the state in which the
data is stored. For example, if two French citizens communicate
by e-mail, their communications may be stored in the United
States. 144 But it is easy to imagine analogous circumstances in
which a foreign state has a much stronger interest in physically
acquiring persons or property than the target state has in
sheltering such persons or property. For example, a person facing
criminal charges in one state may flee to another. Though the
second state may have an obligation to return the accused to the
first state, the first state's officials are not free to enter the target
state's territory merely because of its stronger interest in bring-
ing the accused to justice or because of the target state's lack of
interest in sheltering the individual. Relatedly, the possibility
that an individual will deliberately store data so as to take ad-
vantage of a favorable legal regime does not justify a departure
from the customary international rule against conducting
searches in the territory of another state. Bank secrecy jurisdic-
tions present similar problems, and states do not take the view
that they can physically seize evidence within such jurisdictions
merely because of the interest they may have in retrieving the
evidence. 14
5
144 See note 70 and accompanying text.
145 As discussed earlier, the United States has taken the position that it can compel
the production of the records of foreign banks with branches in the United States. See
notes 86 and 96; In re Grand Jury Proceedings Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F2d 817, 826-29
(lth Cir 1984) (upholding district court order compelling a bank to produce records held
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This discussion suggests that the customary international
law rule against one state conducting investigative activities in
another state's territory provides a strong basis for states to ob-
ject to remote cross-border searches of data within their territory.
Of course, it may be that over time states come to accept such
searches as legitimate. Customary international law, after all, is
formed through the practice of states.146 But to the extent that
states seek to conform their actions to perceptions of applicable
international law rules, there is a strong argument that the gen-
eral rule against conducting investigative activities in the terri-
tory of another sovereign applies even when the searching state's
officials do not enter the target state's territory, but merely inter-
fere with the target state's power to provide privacy or property
protections there.
Notions of state sovereignty underlying the various views
about the internet do not alter this conclusion. A broad reading of
Johnson and Post's conclusions would lead to the view that there
is no basis for a state to object to a remote cross-border search.
But we should be reluctant to accept this broad reading, since the
specific examples on which Johnson and Post rely do not point
toward this view to the exclusion of others, and since it would
undermine the basis for geographically based protections of data
from intentional harms caused by private parties as well. A nar-
rower understanding of Johnson and Post's conclusions leads to
the view that a remote cross-border search, unlike merely making
content accessible, is an act directed at specific territories and
intended to cause harm there.
Goldsmith's broader acceptance of a state's power to regulate
online activities would support two conclusions: the conclusion
that cross-border searches are improper because the searched
state's sovereignty extends to protecting persons and property
within its territory against harmful extraterritorial conduct, in-
cluding that of a foreign state; or the conclusion that cross-border
searches are proper because they are merely incident to the
in a foreign jurisdiction). Other states, at least initially, viewed these U.S. actions as vio-
lative of international law. See note 96. Even if such actions are permissible under inter-
national law, it does not follow that customary international law permits cross-border
searches. To request the U.S. branch of a bank to secure production of records of another
branch located abroad is essentially to impose a regulatory requirement on the local bank
that has the collateral effect of frustrating the policy underlying the foreign jurisdiction's
bank secrecy laws. Compelling the U.S. branch to secure the production of records is, from
the perspective of the foreign state, less invasive than conducting a search of records in
the foreign state.
146 See note 95 and accompanying text.
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searching state's lawful power to regulate extraterritorial conduct
causing local harm. Which view prevails depends upon whether
one views the distinction between jurisdiction to regulate and
jurisdiction to enforce as having continuing force with respect to
internet activities. I have argued that several possible claims that
the distinction lacks continuing force are unpersuasive.
IV. COOPERATIVE CROSS-BORDER
SEARCH ARRANGEMENTS
I argued above that remote cross-border searches conducted
without the permission of the state in which the searched data is
stored generally will violate customary international law. The
logical answer to this problem is, of course, that a state can sim-
ply give the searching state permission to examine data located
within its territory. Some states have responded to the investiga-
tive challenges that computer crime cases present by proposing a
consent-based regime, under which states would permit other
states to conduct cross-border searches in their territory under
defined circumstances.
A consent-based regime permitting foreign searches of U.S.
data would raise difficult policy questions, particularly in light of
the fact that the United States is the repository of so much data.
Such a regime would also raise difficult legal questions. In par-
ticular, one hurdle to such an arrangement is the protection that
domestic law may afford electronic data against certain means of
investigation, even by domestic officials. From the perspective of
the United States, an arrangement recognizing a broad power to
conduct cross-border searches would raise a difficult question of
constitutional law-whether foreign searches of data located
within the United States could proceed on foreign law standards
lower than those of the Fourth Amendment.
I begin addressing this question by examining what con-
straints the Constitution imposes on the United States's ability to
enter into international agreements. It is well established that
such agreements must conform to the Constitution; but whether
a cross-border search arrangement would trigger constitutional
requirements at all is precisely the question we must address.
The answer to that question depends on whether a foreign state's
conduct under the agreement is attributable to the United States
for constitutional purposes. To evaluate the significance of foreign
conduct under a cross-border search arrangement, we can draw
again upon the different conceptions of territorial sovereignty
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discussed in Parts III B and III C. I argue that because states
retain the power to protect data stored within their territory, as
against competing claims by other states with an interest in that
data, a consensual cross-border search arrangement has the sig-
nificant effect of removing legal obstacles to a foreign state's
search. This fact makes the resulting state conduct attributable
to the United States for constitutional purposes. Accordingly, any
agreement permitting remote foreign searches of data located
within the United States must take account of Fourth Amend-
ment concerns.
A. Constitutional Constraints on International Arrangements
On the surface, the question whether the Constitution con-
strains the United States in entering into an arrangement gov-
erning cross-border searches might seem to be relatively straight-
forward. It is well established that treaties must conform to con-
stitutional standards and are invalid insofar as they do not.147
This principle means that an agreement cannot confer upon U.S.
officials a power that the Constitution would otherwise prevent
them from exercising. The leading case reflecting this principle,
Reid v Covert,14 s involved executive agreements and a provision of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) authorizing U.S.
military courts to try dependents of members of the armed ser-
vices for offenses committed overseas.'49 The Court granted ha-
beas relief to two dependents who claimed that their trials by
U.S. courts martial in England and Japan violated Article III,
section 2 of the Constitution and the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments, which imply a requirement of a trial by jury following pre-
sentment or indictment by a grand jury.' Writing for a plurality,
147 See, for example, Boos v Barry, 485 US 312, 324 (1988) (stating the long-standing
principle that international agreements are subject to the Bill of Rights and must conform
to the requirements of the Constitution); Reid v Covert, 354 US 1, 16 (1957) (plurality
opinion) (same); Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 302(2) (1987) ("No provi-
sion of an agreement may contravene any of the prohibitions or limitations of the Consti-
tution applicable to the exercise of authority by the United States."); id at § 302(2) com-
ment b ("The view, once held, that treaties are not subject to constitutional restraints is
now definitely rejected.").
148 354 US 1 (1957).
149 See id at 3-4 (describing the use of Article 118 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice to try the wife of a sergeant in the United States Air Force who murdered her
husband at an airbase in England).
150 Id at 7-8:
The language of Art. III, § 2 manifests that constitutional protections for
the individual were designed to restrict the United States Government
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Justice Black concluded that the article of the UCMJ authorizing
courts martial to exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed by
persons accompanying members of the armed services overseas
could not be sustained as legislation necessary to carry out U.S.
obligations under the international agreements: "The obvious and
decisive answer to this, of course, is that no agreement with a
foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other
branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the
Constitution." 5'
Reid and like cases provide guidance for certain aspects of an
agreement governing cross-border searches: to the extent that an
agreement would confer power upon U.S. officials to conduct re-
mote computer searches of data located abroad, that power must
be exercised in conformity with the Fourth Amendment.'52 To the
when it acts outside of this country, as well as here at home .... The
Fifth and Sixth Amendments, like Art. III, § 2, are also all inclusive with
their sweeping references to "no person" and to "all criminal prosecu-
tions."
151 Id at 16. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan each concurred in the result in Reid on
narrow grounds, thereby confining the Court's holding to circumstances in which depend-
ents of members of the armed forces sought to invoke the protections of the Constitution
in capital cases in time of peace. See id at 45 (Frankfurter concurring); id at 65 (Harlan
concurring). While declining to hold that U.S. citizens are entitled to the full range of
constitutional protections in all overseas criminal prosecutions, neither Justice questioned
the proposition that, in circumstances in which constitutional protections apply, a treaty
cannot authorize the United States to contravene those protections. See id at 56 (Frank-
furter concurring) ("Governmental action abroad is performed under both the authority
and the restrictions of the Constitution-for example, proceedings before American mili-
tary tribunals, whether in Great Britain or in the United States, are subject to the appli-
cable restrictions of the Constitution.").
152 Precisely what the Fourth Amendment requires when the United States conducts a
cross-border search of data physically located abroad is a complicated question. In United
States v Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 US 259 (1990), the Supreme Court held that U.S. officials
could conduct a search in a foreign country without meeting Fourth Amendment require-
ments where the searched party lacked any voluntary connectioh to the United States. Id
at 261, 274-75. Verdugo left open the question whether the Fourth Amendment constrains
a foreign search by U.S. officials of an individual who has a substantial connection to the
United States-that is, a citizen or resident. Id at 274-75 (denying a defendant the right
to claim Fourth Amendment protection for a search occurring when "he was a citizen and
resident of Mexico with no voluntary attachment to the United States"); id at 277-78
(Kennedy concurring) ("[T]he Constitution does not require U.S. agents to obtain a war-
rant when searching the foreign home of a nonresident alien.").
If U.S. officials seek to search the foreign data of a person who lacks a substantial
connection to the United States, Verdugo provides a basis for arguing that Fourth
Amendment requirements do not apply. In the Russian hacking case, see note 23 and
accompanying text, the district court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the data
U.S. agents downloaded from Russian servers in part because the defendant lacked any
significant voluntary association with the United States. United States v Gorshkov, No
CROO-550C at 5 (W D Wash May 23, 2001) [on file with U Chi Legal F] (denying the de-
fendant's motion to suppress evidence). The counterargument, of course, is that the
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extent that the agreement would contemplate remote cross-
border searches by foreign officials of data located in the United
States, the principles of Reid and its progeny are less helpful. The
question in such a case is not whether actions of U.S. officials
taken pursuant to an agreement would violate the Constitution;
as relevant, the agreement would not authorize the United States
to take action at all. Rather, the agreement would authorize for-
eign officials to search data physically located in the United
States. Absent U.S. involvement, foreign officials would not vio-
late the Constitution by conducting such searches: the Fourth
Amendment acts upon U.S., not foreign, officials.'53 It is equally
clear that if a foreign official acted jointly with, or on behalf of,
U.S. officials in particular searches, standard agency principles
might trigger Fourth Amendment requirements.' A cross-border
Fourth Amendment constrains the actions of officials situated on U.S. territory, even if
their actions are directed at a foreign state. Under this theory, the Russian hacking case is
distinguishable from Verdugo because the U.S. officials were situated in the United States
in the former and abroad in the latter.
If U.S. officials seek to search the foreign data of a person with a substantial con-
nection to the United States, pre- and post-Verdugo cases in the lower courts suggest that
they must comply with the Fourth Amendment, although there is a conflict over whether
the Fourth Amendment requires probable cause and a warrant or merely reasonableness
in these circumstances. Compare, for example, Powell v Zuckert, 366 F2d 634, 640 (DC Cir
1966) (holding that a search of serviceman's home in Japan, conducted by U.S. and Japa-
nese officials pursuant to a Japanese warrant, violated the Fourth Amendment); Berlin
Democratic Club v Rumsfeld, 410 F Supp 144 (D DC 1976) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement applies to wiretapping of U.S. citizens overseas), with
United States v Barona, 56 F3d 1087, 1092 n 1 (9th Cir 1995) ("Reasonableness, not prob-
able cause, is undoubtedly the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment."); United States v
Juda, 46 F3d 961, 968 (9th Cir 1995) ("the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard
applies to United States officials conducting a search affecting a United States citizen in a
foreign country"); United States v Peterson, 812 F2d 486, 490 (9th Cir 1987) (measuring
whether a search was consistent with the Fourth Amendment by consulting foreign law
"as part of the determination whether or not the search was reasonable"). Even assuming
that the warrant requirement does not generally apply to U.S. searches wholly conducted
abroad, the requirement may still apply when officials launch a search from U.S. territory,
since such officials are within the supervisory jurisdiction of a court.
In many cases in which U.S. officials seek to search data abroad, officials may be
unaware whether the searched individual has a substantial connection to the United
States. If so, then the Fourth Amendment in practice is likely to constrain U.S. searches of
data physically stored in foreign territory.
153 See Barona, 56 F3d at 1091; United States v Behety, 32 F3d 503, 510 (11th Cir
1994); United States v Heller, 625 F2d 594, 599 (5th Cir 1980); United States v Morrow,
537 F2d 120, 139 (5th Cir 1976). Some courts have stated that where the federal govern-
ment seeks to introduce in federal court evidence obtained by foreign officials without any
participation by U.S. officials, the court may exclude the evidence under an exercise of the
court's supervisory powers if the foreign officials obtained the evidence in a manner that
shocks the conscience. See Behety, 32 F3d at 510; Morrow, 537 F2d at 139.
154 Barona, 56 F3d at 1091-93 ("The second exception to the inapplicability of the
[Fourth Amendment's] exclusionary rule [to the acts of foreign officials] applies when
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search arrangement, however, would not involve joint U.S.-
foreign conduct. Under such an arrangement, U.S. officials would
not participate in, approve on a case-by-case basis, or receive the
fruits of a foreign search in most cases; rather, the arrangement
would simply set forth the circumstances under which the foreign
state could conduct a search.
Cases involving agency principles, however, merely consti-
tute a subset of a larger body of case law addressing when con-
duct undertaken by someone other than a state or federal official
is nevertheless "attributable" to the government. That larger
body of case law forms the Supreme Court's "state action" doc-
trine. For our purposes, the relevant question under the state
action doctrine is whether the United States's involvement in ne-
gotiating or approving a binding instrument permitting foreign
searches of U.S. computers is sufficient to make the United
States responsible for searches later conducted by foreign law
enforcement agents.
It may be thought that the fact that the United States has
any role at all in negotiating a cooperative arrangement and ap-
proving that arrangement makes the question a simple one: the
U.S. involvement is plain, and that is the end of the matter. If so,
it would follow that, since the foreign conduct is attributable to
the United States, the foreign officials cannot conduct searches
that U.S. officials could not conduct. In other words, the United
States could not enter into a treaty arrangement contemplating
foreign searches on terms lower than those in the Fourth
Amendment. Two counterpoints, however, suggest that the mat-
ter is not so straightforward. First, a search cannot be "attribut-
able" to the United States unless the United States has actually
empowered the foreign state to do something. It is easy to con-
ceive of a treaty similar to the remote cross-border search ar-
rangement contemplated here, but that, rather than granting its
'United States agents' participation in the investigation is so substantial that the action is
a joint venture between United States and foreign officials."'); United States v Maturo, 982
F2d 57, 61 (2d Cir 1992) (noting that constitutional requirements may attach to evidence
obtained in a foreign jurisdiction "where the cooperation between the United States and
foreign law enforcement agencies is designed to evade constitutional requirements appli-
cable to American officials"); Peterson, 812 F2d at 490 (noting that the Fourth Amendment
applies to searches by foreign authorities in their own countries when "United States
agents' participation in the investigation is so substantial that the action is a joint venture
between United States and foreign officials"); Heller, 625 F2d at 599 (noting that "if
American officials participated in [a] foreign search or interrogation ... the [Fourth
Amendment's] exclusionary rule should be invoked"); Morrow, 537 F2d at 139 (noting that
"if American law enforcement officials participated in [a] foreign search ... the [Fourth
Amendment's] exclusionary rule can be invoked").
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signatories the power to engage in certain conduct, merely recog-
nizes or even constrains their power. For example, the United
States might enter into a bilateral treaty with France stating
that each state may, under its own domestic law standards, in-
tercept on its own territory telephone calls between France and
the United States. If France would have the power to intercept
the call in the absence of the treaty, the treaty has not empow-
ered France to intercept the call, but merely has recognized
France's preexisting power to do so. It is difficult to argue that a
subsequent French interception would be attributable to the
United States merely by virtue of the fact that the United States
and France have entered into the treaty.
Second, even if we view the arrangement as authorizing or
empowering certain foreign conduct, it is not clear that such ac-
tion is sufficient to trigger the state action doctrine. The law
permits private parties to engage in conduct in which the gov-
ernment could not constitutionally engage; the failure of the gov-
ernment to prevent such conduct is not thought to create consti-
tutional liability.'55 There is no conceptual difference, moreover,
between failing to outlaw conduct and lifting an existing ban on
such conduct. If the United States were to decriminalize hack-
ing,156 for example, surely it would not follow that a private indi-
vidual who gains unauthorized access to a computer system and
examines the contents of another person's e-mail violates the
Fourth Amendment. The fact that the government lifts a legal
barrier to the conduct does not necessarily make the conduct "at-
tributable" to the government for constitutional purposes. It thus
could be argued that a cooperative arrangement allowing a for-
eign state to engage in a search of data located in the United
States should not be regarded differently from any other U.S. ac-
tion that lifts an existing legal barrier to the conduct in question.
To resolve whether U.S. participation in a cooperative ar-
rangement will make foreign conduct under that arrangement
attributable to the United States, we must consider two ques-
tions. First, how do we conceive of a treaty recognizing certain
155 See, for example, DeShaney v Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489
US 189, 196 (1989) (holding that the Due Process Clause places no affirmative duty on
states to provide governmental aid, "even where such aid may be necessary to secure life,
liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individ-
ual").
156 The federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act currently prohibits various conduct
involving intentionally accessing a computer without right. See 18 USC § 1030 (1994 &
Supp 1999) (addressing fraud and related activities in connection with computers).
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circumstances in which states could conduct searches of data
physically located across their borders? When the United States
enters an arrangement envisioning that foreign governments will
search computers located in the United States, is the United
States actually authorizing the foreign search, in the sense of re-
moving legal impediments to the search? Or is it simply recogniz-
ing the power that a foreign government already has to conduct
that search, since the foreign government is merely launching an
investigation from its own territory, without setting foot on U.S.
soil? If the treaty merely confirms an existing power of a foreign
state, the U.S. should not be responsible for how the foreign state
chooses to exercise that power. Second, assuming the United
States does remove legal barriers that limit a foreign state's con-
duct-and thus authorizes the search-is the conduct that follows
necessarily attributable to the United States? In other words,
could the United States authorize a foreign search of data located
in the United States without creating state action? I address
these questions in turn.
B. The Significance of a Cooperative Cross-Border
Search Arrangement
In evaluating the significance of a cooperative cross-border
search arrangement,157 we can draw upon the principles discussed
157 The approach outlined in the text-of determining the extent to which a coopera-
tive arrangement confers, rather than confirms or constrains, power-is consistent with
the approach that the Supreme Court has taken in cases involving status-of-forces agree-
ments (SOFAs) with other countries. In Wilson v Girard, 354 US 524 (1957) (per curiam),
for example, an agreement between the United States and Japan provided that the United
States could exercise jurisdiction over offenses committed in Japan by members of the
U.S. armed forces in the performance of their official duties. Id at 526-28. The United
States could waive jurisdiction in a particular case. After the United States waived itsjurisdiction in Girard's case-thereby permitting Japan to prosecute him-Girard brought
a habeas petition claiming that the waiver was unconstitutional, because it would subject
an American citizen to trial in a tribunal that did not provide basic constitutional guaran-
tees. The Supreme Court summarily rejected the argument, stating: "A sovereign nation
has exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses against its laws committed within its borders,
unless it expressly or impliedly consents to surrender its jurisdiction." Id at 529. The case
can be understood as recognizing that Japan's prosecution of Girard was not attributable
to the United States for constitutional purposes, despite the fact that it was the U.S.
waiver that enabled the prosecution. Rather than granting Japan jurisdiction that it oth-
erwise lacked, the United States merely waived application of an agreement that had
constrained Japan's jurisdiction.
Similarly, courts have rejected claims that the United States cannot constitution-
ally turn a defendant over to a foreign country for trial or to serve a sentence if the foreign
country does not guarantee basic trial rights. See, for example, Holmes v Laird, 459 F2d
1211, 1217-19 (DC Cir 1972) (holding, in a case regarding extradition-like provisions of a
SOFA, that the Constitution does not bar serviceman's return to West Germany to serve a
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in connection with the international law implications of unilat-
eral cross-border searches. As noted above, if a foreign official
physically entered the United States and conducted a search
without U.S. permission, his conduct would likely violate interna-
tional law.'58 Accordingly, we would view an arrangement grant-
ing a foreign official such permission as "authorizing" what for-
eign officials could not otherwise do. We would not view the ar-
rangement as confirming or constraining a power that the foreign
officials already possess.
A cross-border search arrangement for computer data pre-
sents a slightly more complex problem. If a foreign state's domes-
tic law authorizes a search of data, wherever located, that is ac-
cessible from its territory, the state would likely argue that it al-
ready possesses the power to conduct the search, and that any
treaty setting forth circumstances in which its officials could do
so would cabin, not create, that power. The searched country, in
contrast, would likely argue that the treaty removes the con-
straints that its law imposes upon a foreign search. In addition,
the searched state might view the arrangement as providing con-
sent for activity that would otherwise interfere with its territorial
integrity. Which perspective governs the analysis?
We can answer this question by examining the legal obsta-
cles that a searched state could impose upon a foreign search of
data located within its territory."9 The first obstacle, of course, is
sentence for a crime committed in Germany). The court's approach in Holmes can be un-
derstood as reflecting the principle that although U.S. action, as a practical matter, en-
ables foreign action that does not comport with the Constitution, the extradition agree-
ment with the United States does not itself confer on the foreign country any power to try
the defendant that the foreign nation does not already possess. Id at 1216 (noting that
even without U.S. action, "West Germany's power to try and convict for those offenses was
complete"). Because the power the foreign country exercises does not depend upon the
United States's authorization or consent, the foreign country's action is not attributable to
the United States for constitutional purposes. See also Neely v Henkel, 180 US 109, 122-
23 (1901) (examining and rejecting the argument that a statutory provision authorizing
extradition to a foreign jurisdiction in the absence of an extradition treaty is void "in that
it does not secure to the accused, when surrendered to a foreign country for trial in its
tribunals, all of the rights, privileges and immunities that are guaranteed by the Consti-
tution"; concluding that "[w]hen an American citizen commits a crime in a foreign country
he cannot complain if required to submit to such modes of trial and to such punishment as
the laws of that country may prescribe for its own people. .
158 See notes 40-42, 92-93 and accompanying text.
159 In discussing "legal obstacles" to a foreign state's conduct, I am referring to sources
of law that would prohibit the conduct, whether or not the prohibition could successfully
be enforced against the foreign official. Even if the United States may choose not to prose-
cute a foreign official for certain conduct or may have difficulty obtaining jurisdiction over
such an individual, the possibility of a diplomatic protest remains. In other words, the fact
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the norm of customary international law prohibiting a state from
conducting investigative activities in the territory of another
state. I argued in Part III that this prohibition applies even when
officials search data remotely. Domestic law may pose additional
obstacles. In the case of the United States, federal and state pri-
vacy and anti-hacking statutes,6 ° as well as state common law
trespass doctrines, 6' would likely prohibit foreign searches of
that a prosecution or suit may not be successful does not mean that there are no legal
obstacles to foreign conduct.
160 The federal anti-hacking statute prohibits intentionally accessing without right a
computer that is used in interstate or foreign commerce or communication and obtaining
information from it, if the conduct involved an interstate or foreign communication. 18
USCA § 1030(a)(2)(C), (e)(2)(B) (2000). The statute also prohibits knowingly or intention-
ally accessing without right a computer that is used in interstate or foreign commerce if
such conduct causes damage. 18 USCA § 1030(a)(5)(B), (C) (2000). In addition, the federal
Electronic Communications Privacy Act prohibits intentionally accessing a facility
through which an electronic communication service-that is, a service offering users the
ability to send or receive communications, 18 USC § 2510(15) (1994)-is provided, and
thereby obtaining access to an electronic communication in storage with such service. 18
USC § 2701(a)(1) (1994).
All fifty states have adopted some form of computer crime statute. Ala Code § 13A-
8-100-13A-8-103 (1994); Alaska Stat § 11.46.484(a)(5), 11.46.740 (Lexis 2000); Ariz Rev
Stat Ann § 13-2316.01-13-2316.02 (West 2001); Ark Code Ann § 5-41-101-5-41-108 (Mi-
chie 1997); Cal Penal Code § 502 (West 1999); Colo Rev Stat Ann § 18-5.5-101-18-5.5-102
(West Supp 2000); Conn Gen Stat Ann § 53a-250-53a-261 (West 1994 & Supp 2001); 11
Del Code Ann §§ 931-39 (1995 & Supp 2000); Fla Stat Ann § 815.01-815.07 (West 2000);
Ga Code Ann § 16-9-90-16-9-94 (Michie 1999); Hawaii Rev Stat Ann § 708-890-708-893
(Michie 1993); Idaho Code § 18-2201-18-2202 (1997); 720 ILCS 5/16D-1-5/16D-7 (West
1998 & Supp 1999); Ind Code § 35-43-1-4 (1998); Iowa Code Ann §§ 714.1(8), 716.6B (West
Supp 2001); Kan Stat Ann § 21-3755 (1995 & Supp 2000); Ky Rev Stat Ann § 434.840-
434.860 (Michie 2000); La Rev Stat Ann § 14:73.1-14:73.5 (West 1997); 17-A Me Rev Stat
Ann §§ 431-33 (West Supp 2000); Md Ann Code Art 27, § 146 (1996 & Supp 2000); Mass
Ann Laws ch 266, § 120F (Law Co-op Supp 2000); Mich Comp Laws Ann § 752.791-
752.797 (West 1991 & Supp 2000); Minn Stat Ann § 609.87-609.893 (West Supp 2001);
Miss Code Ann § 97-45-1-97-45-13 (1999); Mo Ann Stat § 556.063, 569.099 (West 1999 &
Supp 2001); Mont Code Ann § 45-6-310-45-6-311 (1997); Neb Rev Stat § 28-1341-28-1348
(1995); Nev Rev Stat § 205.473-205.497 (1997); NH Rev Stat Ann § 638:16-638:19 (1996);
NJ Stat Ann § 2C:20-23-2C:20-34 (West 1995); NM Stat Ann § 30-45-1-30-45-7 (Michie
1997); NY Penal Law § 156.00-156.50 (McKinney 1999); NC Gen Stat Ann § 14-453-14-
458 (Michie 1999); ND Cent Code § 12.1-06.1-08 (1997); Ohio Rev Code Ann § 2913.04
(West 1999); 21 Okla Stat §§ 1951-58 (Supp 2001); Or Rev Stat § 164.377 (1999); 18 Pa
Cons Stat Ann § 3933 (West Supp 2000); RI Gen Laws § 11-52-1-11-52-8 (2000); SC Code
Ann § 16-16-10-16-16-40 (Law Co-op 1987 & West Supp 2000); SD Cod Laws § 43-43B-1-
43-43B-8 (Michie 1997); Tenn Code Ann § 39-14-601-39-14-603 (1997); Tex Penal Code
Ann § 33.01-33.04 (West 1994 & Supp 2001); Utah Code Ann § 76-6-701-76-6-705 (1999);
13 Vt Stat Ann § 4101-07 (Supp 2000); Va Code Ann § 18.2-152.1-18.2-152.15 (Michie
1996 & Supp 2000); Wash Rev Code Ann § 9A.52.110-9A.52.130 (West 2000); W Va Code
Ann § 61-3C-1-61-3C-21 (Michie 2000); Wis Stat Ann § 943.70 (West 1996 & Supp 2000);
Wyo Stat Ann § 6-3-501-6-3-505 (Michie 1999). Although the provisions differ widely,
most states prohibit unauthorized access to a computer system.
161 For state law cases suggesting that unauthorized access to a computer system
constitutes a trespass, see Thrifty-Tel Inc v Bezenek, 54 Cal Rptr 2d 468, 473 (App 1996)
(holding that unauthorized use of confidential codes to gain computer access is sufficient
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data located in the United States. So long as these obstacles to
the foreign search are valid ones, the fact that a cooperative ar-
rangement would remove these obstacles suggests that the ar-
rangement would expand, rather than affirm, a foreign state's
power to conduct the search.
Are the legal obstacles that U.S. and state law might impose
upon a foreign search of data valid as against a foreign state's
competing claim that it has a strong interest in accessing the
data? Our previous discussion of the competing conceptions of
territorial sovereignty sheds some light on this question.
The analysis of the Johnson and Post and Goldsmith posi-
tions in connection with the discussion of unilateral cross-border
searches suggests that such obstacles would be valid at least as
against private conduct launched from another state. Although
Johnson and Post generally oppose territorially based regulation
of online activities, their position has the most force when the
activities in question involve making particular content available
without intending that it reach a state where it would be deemed
harmful. When activity is directed at one or many states and in-
tended to cause harm there, the objections to territorially based
regulation are less powerful. There is nothing illegitimate, for
example, about applying a statute outlawing hacking when the
conduct originates from outside of the state's territory. And from
Goldsmith's perspective, the effects principle unquestionably
permits a state to protect data within its territory, even when the
harm originates from outside of its territory.
If these obstacles are valid as against private foreign con-
duct, are they also valid as against official foreign conduct? The
discussion of unilateral cross-border search claims in Part III
suggests that they are. Analyzing unilateral cross-border search
claims yields a concept of territorial sovereignty that is not so
narrow as to prevent a state from protecting privacy or property
interests in data stored in its territory, and not so broad as to
permit a state to intentionally interfere with those protections as
an incident to its power to regulate. 162
to constitute trespass); State v McGraw, 480 NE2d 552, 554 (Ind 1985) (dictum). At least
two federal district courts have also held that interference with a computer system can
constitute a state law trespass. See eBay v Bidder's Edge, 100 F Supp 2d 1058, 1069-72 (N
D Cal 2000) (finding likelihood of success on the merits of a claim that competitor's use of
automated software to gather data from plaintiffs web site constituted a trespass to chat-
tels); CompuServe Inc v Cyber Promotions, Inc, 962 F Supp 1015, 1020-24 (S D Ohio 1997)
(holding that repeated transmission of unsolicited commercial electronic mail through an
internet service provider's system constitutes a trespass under Ohio law).
162 See text accompanying notes 125-46.
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If we accept that the individual states and the United States
have the power to create and protect property rights in electronic
data, through criminal or civil means, based on the data's loca-
tion, the significance of a cooperative arrangement permitting
searches of such data becomes clear. It is proper to look at a
treaty as one that "authorizes" or "empowers" a foreign state to
affect U.S. persons or property in a certain way.
C. The Significance of Authorization under
the State Action Doctrine
I have argued that a treaty contemplating foreign remote
cross-border searches is properly viewed as removing certain le-
gal obstacles validly imposed by the federal or state governments.
The question, then, is under what circumstances does removing
legal obstacles to foreign conduct make the conduct now author-
ized or permitted attributable to the government for constitu-
tional purposes? Answering this question requires us to delve
more deeply into the Supreme Court's state action doctrine--one
of the most complex and, some would argue, problematic areas of
constitutional law.'63 In particular, many critics claim that the
163 See, for example, Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword:
"State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 Harv L Rev 69, 95
(1967) (describing the state action doctrine as a "conceptual disaster area"); Lawrence A.
Alexander, Cutting the Gordian Knot: State Action and Self-Help Repossession, 2 Hastings
Const L Q 893, 894-96, 906, 934 (1975); Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80
Nw U L Rev 503, 505 (1985) (noting that scholars for twenty years argued that the state
action doctrine "never could be rationally or consistently applied"); Jesse H. Choper,
Thoughts on State Action: The "Government Function" and "Power Theory" Approaches,
1979 Wash U L Q 757, 757 (1979) (commenting on how the state action doctrine "contin-
ues to confound both courts and commentators"); Robert J. Glennon, Jr. and John E.
Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State Action" Requirement,
1976 S Ct Rev 221, 221 (noting the difficulties in defining state action because of the lack
of 'generally accepted formulas for determining when a sufficient amount of government
action is present in a practice to justify subjecting it to constitutional restraints"); Alan R.
Madry, Private Accountability and the Fourteenth Amendment: State Action, Federalism
and Congress, 59 Mo L Rev 499, 500 (1994) (arguing that the problem with the state ac-
tion doctrine is that "[i]t reflects a profound ignorance of the workings of federalism and
the origins and concerns of the Fourteenth Amendment"); William P. Marshall, Diluting
Constitutional Rights: Rethinking "Rethinking State Action", 80 Nw U L Rev 558, 570
(1985) (stating that the current interpretation of the state action doctrine can only be
defended through 'intellectual dishonesty"); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 Colum
L Rev 873, 888 (1987) (noting apparently incoherent Supreme Court state action rulings
and arguing that "the search for state action can be made coherent only against a back-
ground normative theory of the legitimate or normal activities of government. Without
such a theory, the search is unguided"). But see Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Choices
248 (Harvard 1985) ("The conventional wisdom on this subject-that the 'doctrine' of state
action is too deeply incoherent and internally conflicted to be taken seriously-seems to
me flatly wrong and, if anything, obstructive of serious critical efforts.").
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Supreme Court's state action doctrine is incoherent."M Much of
the claimed incoherence is attributable to the development of the
doctrine in cases involving race discrimination.'65 The Court loos-
ened the doctrine from the 1940s through the 1960s, so as to
combat acts of discrimination that, though committed by private
parties, were essentially supported or even required by the
States.' The looser interpretation of the state action require-
ment also prevented government actors from evading constitu-
tional limits on their conduct by transferring certain functions to
private parties.'67 More recently, outside of the racial context, the
164 See Chemerinsky, 80 Nw U L Rev at 504-05 (cited in note 163) (commenting on
how scholars have shown the "incoherence" of the state action problem); Black, 81 Harv L
Rev at 95 (cited in note 163) ("conceptual disaster area"); Choper, 1979 Wash U L Q at 757
(cited in note 163) (noting the "confounding" nature of the state action doctrine).
165 See Glennon and Nowak, 1976 S Ct Rev at 222-24 (cited in note 163) (arguing that
racial discrimination cases sounded "[tihe death knell for formal state action theories").
166 See, for example, Evans v Newton, 382 US 296, 301-02 (1966) (holding that where a
city's maintenance of land as a trustee was an integral part of its activities, the land be-
came a public facility and could not be operated on a segregated basis even when control of
it passed into private hands); Burton v Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 US 715, 725
(1961) (holding that exclusion of a black restaurant patron violated the Equal Protection
Clause, where a state agency leased space in a publicly owned and financed building to
the restaurant owner); Terry v Adams, 345 US 461, 469-70 (1953) (plurality opinion)
(finding that a private political organization's exclusion of blacks from its primaries vio-
lated the Fifteenth Amendment where, in practice, the outcome of the organization's elec-
tion always determined the outcome of the county's Democratic primary); Shelley v
Kraemer, 334 US 1, 20 (1948) (holding that a state's judicial enforcement of a racially
restrictive covenant violated the Equal Protection Clause). For discussions of the racial
context in which the state action doctrine developed, see, for example, David A. Strauss,
State Action After the Civil Rights Era, 10 Const Commen 409, 411-14 (1993) (discussing
the state action doctrine in the civil rights era); Madry, 59 Mo L Rev at 507-10 (cited in
note 163) (considering the development of the state action doctrine in cases where blacks
were excluded from voting in Democratic primaries and subsequent findings of state ac-
tion in private conduct); Choper, 1979 Wash U L Q at 758-59 (cited in note 163) (com-
menting that until the Civil Rights Act of 1964, most litigation over the state action doc-
trine dealt with private racial discrimination).
167 The loosening of the state action requirement in cases where the Court perceives
the government to be attempting to evade constitutional strictures by shifting functions to
private parties is well illustrated by the Court's response to Texas's attempts to exclude
blacks from primary elections. After the Supreme Court struck down an outright prohibi-
tion on blacks' participation in Democratic party primary elections in Texas, see Nixon v
Herndon, 273 US 536 (1927), the state passed a law permitting political parties, through
their executive committees, to decide who would be permitted to vote in party elections. In
a challenge to the Texas Democratic Party's decision to exclude black voters from a pri-
mary, the Court found state action on the ground that the state statute had vested power
in the executive committee that the committee did not otherwise possess under state law,
making party executive committees "organs of the State itself, the repositories of official
power." Nixon v Condon, 286 US 73, 88 (1932). The state then transferred all questions of
party political membership to the parties themselves; the Texas Democratic Party limited
its membership-and thus the participants in its primaries-to white citizens. The Court
again found state action, in view of the extensive regulatory structure governing the pri-
mary process in Texas. Smith v Allwright, 321 US 649, 663-64 (1944). See also Terry, 345
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Supreme Court has strictly defined what qualifies as governmen-
tal conduct for constitutional purposes. 6 ' Even taking these doc-
trinal shifts into account, some critics advocate that the Court
adopt a broader conception of what qualifies as government ac-
tion;169 and some even advocate that the Supreme Court jettison
the doctrine altogether.' ° I do not attempt to enter this debate
here. As I illustrate below, even under the Supreme Court's strict
application of the state action doctrine, there is a powerful argu-
ment that U.S. participation in an arrangement effectively "au-
thorizing" searches by foreign officials affecting data located in
the United States makes those searches attributable to the
United States for constitutional purposes.
Modern state action cases essentially acknowledge a unitary,
but highly fact-specific, model of state action, as set forth in
Lugar v Edmonson Oil Co. 7' That model first requires a showing
of a constitutional deprivation "caused by the exercise of some
right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct im-
posed by the State or by a person for whom the State is responsi-
ble."" ' Where the government authorizes particular conduct by
statute or treaty, this first part of the Court's model is satisfied.
Second, the third party claimed to have given rise to the depriva-
US at 469-70 (holding that even without state control, a private organization's primaries
could satisfy the state action requirement when they were "an integral part ... of the
elective process that determines who shall rule and govern").
168 See, for example, American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co v Sullivan, 526 US
40, 49-58 (1999) (rejecting an argument that a private insurer is a state actor when it
withholds payment for disputed medical expenses, as permitted under state law); Blum v
Yaretsky, 457 US 991, 1002-12 (1982) (rejecting a claim that involuntary discharge or
transfer of nursing home patients violates the Due Process Clause; holding that nursing
homes' decisions do not constitute state action merely because the state regulates them);
Rendell-Baker v Kohn, 457 US 830, 837-43 (1982) (holding that state is not responsible for
a private school's discharge of a teacher); Jackson v Metropolitan Edison Co, 419 US 345,
351-59 (1974) (rejecting the claim that privately owned and operated utility is a state
actor and that termination of service without notice and an opportunity to be heard vio-
lated the Due Process Clause).
169 See, for example, Larry Alexander, The Public/Private Distinction and Constitu-
tional Limits on Private Power, 10 Const Commen 361, 371-77 (1993) (advocating the
adoption of a three-step analysis of private actions by comparing them to analogous state
actions in order to determine whether or not they are constitutional).
170 See, for example, Chemerinsky, 80 Nw U L Rev at 506 (cited in note 163) (arguing
that "limiting the Constitution's protections of individual rights to state action is anachro-
nistic, harmful to the most important personal liberties, completely unnecessary, and even
detrimental to the very goals that it originally intended to accomplish"). But see Richard
S. Kay, The State Action Doctrine, The Public-Private Distinction, and the Independence of
Constitutional Law, 10 Const Commen 329, 337-41 (1993) (defending the state action
doctrine as preserving the distinction between constitutional law and ordinary law).
171 457 US 922 (1982).
172 Id at 937.
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tion "must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state ac-
tor."'73 Where the party responsible for the deprivation is not a
state or federal official, a showing that the conduct is chargeable
to the government can be made in one of two ways: by demon-
strating that the nongovernmental actor is essentially supplant-
ing the state in the performance of a public function that tradi-
tionally has been exclusively reserved to the sovereign;'. 4 or by
demonstrating particular facts and circumstances that give rise
to the conclusion that the government has jointly participated
in 75 or compelled 76 the conduct in question.
It might be thought that conducting a search for law en-
forcement purposes is clearly a function traditionally reserved to
the sovereign, and that U.S. involvement in a treaty arrangement
under which such a search would occur makes the search attrib-
utable to the state. Under the Court's doctrine, however, the pub-
lic function exception is extremely narrow: it applies only to cir-
cumstances in which a private party supplants the government in
performing a function that is "traditionally the exclusive preroga-
tive of the State.""'7 That foreign conduct under a cross-border
search arrangement would not supplant U.S. conduct is clear; the
United States would not even receive the results of the tests in
most cases. Nor, in light of the existence of private detectives,
would the investigative function likely be found exclusive under
the Court's doctrine.
We turn, then, to the second method of demonstrating that
conduct is chargeable to the government: by showing circum-
stances that give rise to the conclusion that the government has
participated in or compelled the conduct in question. Although
this requirement from Lugar might suggest that an arrangement
173 Id.
174 Id at 938. For cases discussing and applying the public function test, see Jackson,
419 US 345 (discussing whether furnishing utility services is a public function); Terry, 345
US 461 (considering whether elections are a public function); Marsh v Alabama, 326 US
501 (1946) (examining whether a town operated and owned by a private corporation quali-
fied as a public function).
175 Lugar, 457 US at 937, 941.
176 See Blum, 457 US at 1004 ("[A] State normally can be held responsible for a private
decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant en-
couragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of
the State."); Adickes v S.H. Kress & Co, 398 US 144, 170 (1970) (holding the state respon-
sible for discriminatory acts of private parties when the State, by law, compelled the act).
177 Jackson, 419 US at 353. Compare Rendell-Baker, 457 US at 842 (holding that pro-
viding education is not traditionally an exclusive public function), with Terry, 345 US at
469-70 (conducting elections is a public function); Marsh, 326 US at 507 (finding state
action where a private company performed all municipal functions in a town).
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under which the United States authorizes searches of computers
within U.S. territory (without directly participating in or compel-
ling the searches) will not give rise to a finding of state action,
the underlying case law is actually more nuanced. By way of il-
lustration, it is useful to examine two cases in which the Court
has considered claims that the government's "authorization" of
certain conduct makes the conduct attributable to the United
States.
The first is one of the cases on which Lugar relied for its syn-
thesis of the state action doctrine.' Flagg Brothers v Brooks 7 '
involved the claims of two property owners who had placed cer-
tain goods with a storage company. A New York self-help statute
authorized storage companies to sell goods when a property
owner failed to pay a fee. 8° The statute did not require the com-
pany to provide property owners with an opportunity to be heard
prior to the sale of the property.' Although the Court did not
address the matter,'82 we can assume that if the state itself had
custody of the goods, it could not sell them in the manner the
statute permitted: if it did, it would violate the Due Process
Clause. When a dispute arose over the payment of fees and the
storage company threatened to sell the goods, the property own-
ers sued, claiming that the private storage company's threatened
sale violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.'83 Although the state would not be involved in the sale, the
property owners argued, among other things, that the state was
nevertheless responsible for the sale, because it had passed a
statute "authorizing" the private conduct. 4  Without the
authorizing statute, the storage company could not have sold the
goods without the risk that the property owners would sue the
178 457 US at 938-39.
179 436 US 149 (1978). For commentary on Flagg Brothers, see Thomas D. Rowe Jr.,
The Emerging Threshold Approach to State Action Determinations: Trying to Make Sense
of Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 69 Georgetown L J 745, 759-62 (1981) (arguing that the
Flagg Brothers state action doctrine makes sense if limited to nonordinary cases and if the
compulsion criterion is only a possible route to finding state action rather than a require-
ment); Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v.
Brooks, 130 U Pa L Rev 1296 (1982) (critiquing the Court's state action doctrine and how
it addresses concerns over preventing abuses of power and protecting individual auton-
omy).
180 Flagg Brothers, 436 US at 151 n 1.
181 Id.
182 Id at 155 n 4.
183 The property owners also claimed that the sale would violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id at 153.
184 Flagg Brothers, 436 US at 164.
[2001:
CHASING BITS ACROSS BORDERS
storage company under a conversion theory; the statute essen-
tially immunized the storage company from such a claim. Since
the storage company could not have sold the property without
fear that its actions would later be found to violate the law, the
property owners claimed that the statutory authorization was
sufficient to make the sale attributable to the State.185
The Court rejected the property owners' claim, concluding
that authorization of private conduct, without more, does not
make the subsequent private conduct attributable to the govern-
ment."6 Although the statute in question adjusted traditional
rules governing property arrangements, announcing circum-
stances in which New York courts would not interfere with pri-
vate conduct, the statute still left to the storage company the
choice whether to avail itself of the statutory self-help remedy."8 7
The government, the Court reasoned, could not be held responsi-
ble for the choice.'88
At first glance, it would seem that Flagg Brothers decisively
settles the question under consideration here-whether govern-
ment action "authorizing" certain conduct, in the sense of remov-
ing legal barriers that would otherwise deter someone from en-
gaging in it, makes the conduct attributable to the government.
Based on Flagg Brothers, one would conclude that the govern-
ment is free to permit whatever conduct it chooses; it is only re-
sponsible for conduct it compels.
A second case involving government authorization of private
conduct, however, complicates the matter. In Skinner v Railway
Labor Executives' Association,8 9 the Court considered a constitu-
tional challenge to federal regulations authorizing private rail-
road companies to require their employees to submit to blood or
urine tests under certain circumstances. 9 ' The regulations pre-
empted any state law provisions and collective bargaining agree-
ments that would have barred the testing. 9' Under the regula-
tions, the Federal Railroad Administration would have the right
to receive test results if the private company performed the
test.192 Employees claimed that the regulations needed to be scru-
185 Id at 156.
186 Id at 164-65.
187 Id at 165.
188 See Flagg Brothers, 436 US at 165.
189 489 US 602 (1989).
190 Id at 611-12. Some of the federal regulations made testing mandatory. I am con-
cerned here only with the permissive regulations.
191 Id at 615.
192 Id.
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tinized under the Fourth Amendment, because tests the railroad
would conduct under the regulations were attributable to the
state. 193
The Court agreed with the employees that there was state
action. 94 On the surface, it appears that the Court, testing for
state participation or compulsion, found more than mere "au-
thorization" of the private railroads' conduct. 95 The Court classi-
fied the government's action as "encouragement" of, "endorse-
ment" of, and "participation" in the conduct.'96 The finding of en-
couragement, endorsement, and participation, however, was
based principally-if not solely-on two factors: the fact that the
regulations preempted contrary state law and collective bargain-
ing provisions and the fact that the federal government could re-
ceive test results if it chose.'97 As to the first factor, preemption of
contrary state law and collective bargaining agreements is noth-
ing more than "authorization."'98 Although the result is accom-
plished by the federal government, rather than a state, a federal
regulation with preemptive force is no different from a state law
clarifying a legal regime to indicate what conduct is permissible.
As to the second factor, it is difficult to see how the possibility
that the government may receive a result of a test that may (or
may not) occur influences one way or the other the railroad com-
pany's decision whether to conduct the test. The decision to per-
form a test in a specific case-or even to formulate company
guidelines under which such tests will be performed-remains a
private choice.
Flagg Brothers and Skinner, thus, seem to compel precisely
opposite conclusions with respect to the question whether gov-
ernment authorization of private conduct makes that conduct
attributable to the government. Flagg Brothers states that mere
authorization is insufficient; 99 Skinner purports to find "partici-
pation" and "encouragement" in questionable circumstances,
when the government conduct looks much like mere authoriza-
tion."'0 Upon closer analysis, however, there is a plausible basis
upon which the cases can be reconciled, one that would place an
193 See Skinner, 489 US at 612-13.
194 See id at 614-16.
195 See id at 615-16.
196 Id.
197 See Skinner, 489 US at 615.
198 Id.
199 436 US at 164.
200 489 US at 615-16.
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arrangement governing cross-border searches by foreign officials
on the Skinner side of the state action line.
The Lugar test-implicitly followed in Skinner and carried
forward in more recent cases-oversimplifies the state action
model with respect to authorization-type cases. In attempting to
draw a clear line between "authorization" on the one hand and
"participation" or "compulsion" on the other, the Lugar test fails
to capture the distinction between two different kinds of authori-
zation cases. The distinction is well illustrated by Flagg Brothers
and Skinner themselves.
The Supreme Court's instinct in Flagg Brothers is that, when
the state merely adjusts common law property or tort rules, any
private conduct that follows is not attributable to the state.2"' The
new rule may give parties certainty about their rights; it may
shift an immunity from one party to another; or it may establish
a default rule around which the parties can contract. Although
the policy underlying the statute may reflect an accommodation
of or choice between conflicting interests, any benefit that flows to
the state-for example, having fewer disputes in its courts-is
quite attenuated. In other words, to the extent that the state it-
self is in a better position than if it had merely left the common
law regime intact, any benefit the state receives bears only a dis-
tant relationship to the underlying policy choice the state made.
The new rule may change the position of the parties with respect
to one another, but the state's posture is essentially "neutral," in
the sense that no power or benefit flows directly to the state from
the state's choice of policy.
201 See, for example, Flagg Brothers, 436 US at 160-61, 161 n 9, 165-66 (holding that
resolving disputes between debtors and creditors is not traditionally an exclusive state
function and commenting that the state's statutory refusal to act is no different than a
statute of limitations, saying that the state will not provide a remedy after a given period
of time). The Court's instinct is consistent with a conceptual point scholars frequently
make in discussing the Court's state action doctrine-that all private action takes place
against the backdrop of state "permission," see Alexander, 10 Const Commen at 362-63
(cited in note 169)-and is also consistent with some scholars' normative view that this
fact alone cannot make the private conduct attributable to the government. See, for exam-
ple, Harry H. Wellington, The Constitution, The Labor Union, and "Governmental Action,"
70 Yale L J 345, 356-57 (1961) (arguing that federal preemption of state regulations can-
not be the sole basis for finding state action; otherwise "all private action taken under the
authority of federal legislation that occupies a field by that token alone becomes govern-
mental action," requiring the government to outlaw private behavior in which the gov-
ernment could not itself constitutionally engage); Kenneth L. Karst and Harold W.
Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 S Ct Rev
39, 52 ("[I]t would be foolish to say that the state has unconstitutionally become a partner
in... private practices [merely] because it permits them .... ").
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In a case like Skinner, the situation is quite different. The
regulations authorizing blood and urine testing by railroad com-
panies preempted contrary state law and collective bargaining
agreements.2"2 This fact alone may not be significant: as in Flagg
Brothers, the regulations authorizing railroad testing, without
more, might simply reflect a choice between various policy inter-
ests (in promoting railroad safety or protecting employee privacy,
for example). But there is more at work here. The government
has the right to receive the test results when a railroad company
performs the test.20 3 Although it is not correct to say that the gov-
ernment "participates" in the underlying private conduct, or that
it compels or even encourages the test, the government has still
done something significant. It has chosen between conflicting pol-
icy interests, just as the state government did in Flagg Brothers.
But in the course of doing so, it has bargained for an important
and direct benefit-the right to the results of the tests. Unlike in
Flagg Brothers, we cannot view the government as "neutral" in
making its policy choice.
This analysis suggests a more nuanced view of the signifi-
cance of "authorization" under the state action doctrine. When
the government authorizes certain conduct-whether private
conduct or that of foreign officials-it cannot always be assumed
that there is no state action, on the theory that the government is
simply adjusting background permissions and prohibitions on the
underlying conduct. State action may be present even where a
typical agency relationship is lacking in a particular case. Recog-
nizing that there are certain core functions that the government
performs-among them, investigation and prosecution-it is pos-
sible to distinguish between an "authorization" like that in Flagg
Brothers, where the government merely adjusts rules affecting
private individuals, and an "authorization" like that in Skinner,
where the government adjusts those rules but gives itself a bene-
fit or power, in connection with particular public functions it per-
forms, in the process. Outside of the agency context, where the
government achieves a benefit or increases its power in exchange
for authorizing conduct-be it private or that of a foreign sover-
eign-that conduct is attributable to the government. The gov-
ernment is in no sense neutral in the policy choice it makes.
This is precisely what happens when the government negoti-
ates with another sovereign and, as part of the bargain struck,
202 See Skinner, 489 US at 615.
203 See id.
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selectively removes legal obstacles that would otherwise bar that
state from affecting property or persons that federal or state law
protects. A treaty permitting remote cross-border searches would
have three important effects: it would remove any diplomatic ob-
jection the United States might have against foreign law en-
forcement activity conducted within its borders; it would displace
the federal and state anti-hacking and privacy statutes; and it
would preempt state law, such as trespass doctrines, that might
otherwise protect the data in question. It would do so in exchange
for a very important benefit: the United States' reciprocal power
to search communications located in foreign countries. When the
U.S. bargains for its own right to conduct remote searches
abroad, and essentially exchanges existing legal protections of
U.S. property and persons for that right, the foreign conduct that
follows is attributable to the United States for constitutional pur-
poses. Under this theory, it would not matter that the United
States does not compel or participate in a foreign search in a par-
ticular instance.
As this discussion suggests, although a consent-based regime
governing remote cross-border searches might resolve problems of
international law, it has the potential to create problems under
domestic law. Under state action principles, foreign conduct au-
thorized by an international agreement will be attributable to the
United States. To the extent that the United States seeks to par-
ticipate in consensual cross-border search arrangements, then, it
must take into account the limitations that the Fourth Amend-
ment imposes upon government conduct." 4
204 It is beyond the scope of this Article to consider in detail what limitations the
Fourth Amendment would impose on foreign officials by virtue of U.S. involvement in
empowering searches of data in the United States. Generally speaking, when a state ac-
tion analysis makes conduct attributable to U.S. officials, that conduct is subject to the
same limitations that would apply if U.S. officials engaged in it. The constitutional re-
quirements for a search or seizure by U.S. officials of data protected by the Fourth
Amendment are highly fact dependent. At a minimum, if a person has a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in the data, U.S. officials could search that data, in the absence of any
exigent circumstances, only with a warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate
based on probable cause to believe that the data reflects evidence of a crime. See, for ex-
ample, Berger v New York, 388 US 41, 54-55 (1967) (measuring a state eavesdropping
statute against Fourth Amendment requirements). As previously noted, if officials believe
that data might otherwise be lost, the Fourth Amendment might permit them to freeze
the data, so long as they still have individual suspicion rising to the level of probable
cause. See note 91.
One of the major problems in applying Fourth Amendment requirements to
searches by foreign officials is determining whether the warrant requirement applies. As
previously discussed, in some cases in which searches occurring abroad are attributable to
U.S. officials, courts have applied only the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness require-
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CONCLUSION
As computer crime becomes more widespread, states will in-
creasingly face difficulties in retrieving evidence stored in elec-
tronic form. Potential solutions to these difficulties present com-
plicated legal issues, requiring us to address how the rise of
online activities cutting across international borders affects state
power to protect data stored within its territory.
In developing a legal framework for evaluating these issues,
we have drawn upon the two sides of an important scholarly de-
bate about whether states can and should regulate online activi-
ties. Analyzing cross-border search claims in light of the poles in
this debate helps to refine our understanding of how concepts of
territorial sovereignty apply in the internet context. This analy-
sis, I have argued, points away from a broad conclusion that ter-
ritorially-based regulation of internet activities is always prob-
lematic. Likewise, it points away from the conclusion that even if
it is permissible to apply territorially based privacy or property
protections against private conduct, such regulations are no bar-
rier to the conduct of a foreign state that seeks to advance its own
regulatory interests.
To the extent that states seek to claim a unilateral power to
conduct cross-border searches, such claims may be problematic
under international law. There are strong arguments that the
customary international law prohibition on performing law en-
forcement functions in the territory of another sovereign applies
even when law enforcement officials do not enter the territory of
another state. This is not to say that all unilateral cross-border
searches will violate international law; in some circumstances, it
may not be possible for a state to know that the data it is search-
ing is located beyond its borders. In addition, because the cus-
tomary international law prohibition on conducting law enforce-
ment functions arguably does not apply when a nation acts in
self-defense," 5 there may be extreme circumstances in which a
cross-border search is permissible despite the breach of sover-
eignty. To take one example, a cross-border search or other en-
forcement action might be permissible-and, indeed, appropri-
ment. See note 152. Those situations are slightly different from the cross-border search
situation, because the foreign officials and the searched property are both located abroad.
When a foreign official conducts a cross-border search, the data is located in the United
States. As in the reverse situation, when a U.S. official conducts a cross-border search, it
is difficult to assign an exclusive location to the search. Id.
205 See note 41.
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ate-if foreign computers were being used in a state-sponsored or
terrorist attack that threatened the nation's communications in-
frastructure.
To the extent that states seek to adopt multilateral and bi-
lateral arrangements setting forth circumstances under which
states can conduct cross-border searches, domestic law may im-
pose some limitations. In the case of the United States, I argued,
the Constitution limits government officials from permitting for-
eign searches on terms lower than those the Fourth Amendment
requires in exchange for a U.S. power to conduct searches abroad.
Customary international law and domestic law impose valid legal
obstacles on foreign cross-border searches, and the removal of
those legal obstacles should make the subsequent foreign conduct
attributable to the United States. This is not to say that the re-
quirements of the Fourth Amendment would apply to every for-
eign search conducted under such a treaty, regardless of whether
the person whose privacy interest was affected has any substan-
tial connection to the United States. Nor am I suggesting that the
U.S. could not develop principles consistent with the Fourth
Amendment under which cross-border searches could occur. I
have simply argued that the U.S. needs to take Fourth Amend-
ment principles into account in formulating its policies.

